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INTRODUCTION

Over the past forty years, philosophers have given way to social scientists in
examining happiness. There is, however, a significant difference in approach. Whereas
philosophers have spent millennia searching for the meaning of happiness, social
scientists have foregone the definitional search in favor of measurement-looking for
answers about the causes of, and reasons for, happiness.
The early findings from this research are quite surprising; and despite the fact that
this research is still nascent, the happiness revolution' is coming to legal scholarship.

t Copyright © 2010 Rick Swedloff& Peter H. Huang.
* Thanks to Jane Baron, Ed Deiner, David Hoffman, Kareem Johnson, Leo Katz, Alan
Krueger, Andrew J. Oswald, Donald Overton, Peter Spiro; audience members of the American
Law and Economics Association annual meeting and the Midwest Law and Economics
Association annual meeting; and faculty workshops at Florida State University Law School,
University of Missouri Law School, Rutgers University-Camden Law School, Temple Law
School, and the Social Psychology Colloquium at Temple University, for helpful comments and
suggestions.
** Visiting Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law, Camden. J.D., University of
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Haverford College.
*** Harold E. Kohn Chair Professor of Law, James E. Beasley School of Law, Temple
University. Visiting Lecturer in Law. Yale Law School. J.D., Stanford Law School; Ph.D.,
Harvard University; A.B., Princeton University.
1. It does not seem a stretch to refer to the scholarship and press related to the new science
of happiness as a "revolution." In the past five years, there have been scores of books, dozens of
academic articles, and a fair smattering of popular press devoted to questions about happiness.
As to the books, see generally ED DIENER & ROBERT BISWAS-DIENER, HAPPINESS: UNLOCKING
THE MYSTERIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WEALTH (2008); BARBARA FREDRICKSON, PosrrvY:
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Since 2007, the legal hedonists have published a number of articles arguing that new
empirical data on happiness requires changes to, or a better explanation of, existing
legal institutions. These scholars have so far set their sights on changing the taxation,
corporate governance, 3 criminal justice,4 and tort systems.5 And there is no reason to
believe they will stop there.
How TO EMBRACE THE HIDDEN STRENGTH OF POSITIVE
EMOTIONS, OVERCOME NEGATIVITY, AND THRIVE (2009); BRUNO S. FREY, HAPPINESS: A
REVOLUTION INECONOMICS (2008); HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF HAPPINESS (Luigino Bruni
& Pier Luigi Porta eds., 2007); DANIEL M. HAYBRON, THE PURSUIT OF UNHAPPINESS: THE
ELUSIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF WELL-BEING (2008); DACHER KELTNER, BORN TO BE GOOD: THE
SCIENCE OF A MEANINGFUL LIFE (2009); BERNARD M. S. VAN PRAAG & ADA FERRER-ICARBONELL, HAPPINESS QUANTIFIED: A SATISFACnON CALCULUS APPROACH (Rev. ed. 2008). For
a review of the academic literature, see generally Peter H. Huang, Authentic Happiness, Self
Knowledge, and Legal Policy, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 755 (2008). For a sample of the
popular press devoted to happiness, see Alice Park, The HappinessEffect: How Emotions and
Even Behaviors can Spread like an Epidemic, TIME, Dec. 22, 2008, at 40; 20/20: Happiness:
How to Find It, UnderstandIt and Achieve It, (ABC television broadcast Jan. 11, 2008); 60
Minutes: The Pursuitof Happiness (CBS television broadcast Feb. 18, 2008); Laura Blue, Is
Our
Happiness
Preordained,
TIME.COM,
Mar.
12,
2008,
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1721954,00.html; Tiffany Sharples, Can You
PredictHappiness, TIME.COM, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
0,8599,1714473,00.html.
2. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Stop Taxing Happiness: A New
Perspectiveon ProgressiveTaxation, 2 PrTrSBURGH TAX REV.65 (2005) (arguing that empirical
happiness research data supports progressive taxes); Robert H. Frank, ProgressiveConsumption
Taxation as a Remedy for the U.S. Savings Shortfall, 2 ECONOMIST'S VOICE 1 (2005),
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=ev (arguing that imposing a
progressive consumption tax remedies a primary reason that Americans save so little, namely the
pressure to keep up with community spending standards, that have been exacerbated recently by
rising income and wealth inequality); Thomas D. Griffith, ProgressiveTaxationandHappiness,
45 B.C. L. REv. 1363 (2004) (arguing that happiness research provides additional support for
progressive taxation); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Educating Ourselves Towards a Progressive
(andHappier)Tax: A Commentary on Griffith 'sProgressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C.
L. REv. 1399 (2004) (proposing a national tax literacy campaign to increase public knowledge
about and acceptance of progressive taxation). But see Diane M. Ring, Why Happiness?:A
Commentary on Griffh "sProgressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1413 (2004)
(examining issues raised by proposals to use happiness research in determining tax policy);
David A. Weisbach, What Does Happiness Research Tell Us About Taxation?, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. S293 (2008) (examining arguments for progressive taxation and concluding they are not
supported by existing data or models about happiness).
3. See, e.g., JAMES MCCONVILL, THE FALSE PROMISE OF PAY FOR PERFORMANCE:
EMBRACING A POSIIVE MODEL OF THE COMPANY EXECUTIVE (2005) (arguing that happiness
research explains why existing CEO compensation practices are misguided); JAMES MCCONYIL,
GROUNDBREAKING RESEARCH REVEALS

SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND THE CORPORATION: A FRESH INTER-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH

INHAPPINESS (2006); James McConvill, Executive Compensationand CorporateGovernance:
Rising Above the "Pay-for-Performance"Principle,43 AM. Bus. L.J. 413, 416-17, 421-30
(2006) (arguing that happiness research explains why existing CEO compensation practices are
misguided); James A. McConvill, Positive CorporateGovernance,6 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 51,5762 (2006) (arguing that corporate law should recognize and foster potential and strengths of
company executives, rather than simply trying to control them by imposing corporate
governance requirements); James McConvill, ShareholderEmpowerment as an Endin Itself A

2010]

TORTDAMAGES AND THE NEW SCIENCE OFHAPPINESS

555

In large measure, the legal hedonists rely on two early findings from the happiness
literature to undergird their work. The first is hedonic adaptation. This term refers to a
finding that neither one's life circumstances nor external life events have much lasting
impact on long-term affect. That is, better-educated, prettier, and wealthier people are
not necessarily happier. 6 Likewise, people who win the lottery or become disabled do
not note a significant change in happiness over the long term.7 Although someone who
becomes disabled may be less happy for a short time period, in the long run, her
happiness will return to its preinjury state.8
New Perspectiveon Allocation of Power in the Modern Corporation,33 OHIO N.U. L. REV.

1013 (2007) (arguing that shareholder participation can be a vehicle for realizing happiness);
(same). But see Harry G. Hutchison & R. Sean Alley, Against ShareholderParticipation:A
Treatmentfor McConvill's Psychonomicosis, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 41 (2007)

(arguing critically against McConvill's Panglossian proposals for enhanced shareholder
participation); Harry G. Hutchison & R. Sean Alley, The High Costs of Shareholder
Participation,11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. (forthcoming 2009) (same).
4. See Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Giving Content to the Principle of
Proportionality: Happiness and Pain as the Universal Currency for Matching Offence
Seriousness andPenalty Severity, 69 J. CRIM. L. 50 (2005) (arguing that pain and unhappiness

data can ensure punishments imposed match the severity of crimes); John Bronsteen,
Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment,76 U. CHL.
L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1241008 (arguing that happiness
research implies that retributivists and utilitarians must seek novel ways to calibrate traditional
punitive sanctions).
5. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REv. 745 (2007); John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits,
108 COLUM. L. REv. 1516 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157
(2008); Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Painand Suffering Awards: They Shouldn'tBe
(Just)About Pain and Suffering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S195 (2008).
6. Richard E. Lucas, Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis & Ed Diener, Unemployment
Alters the Set Pointfor Life Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. ScL 8, 8 (2004) (finding that life

circumstances like income, education, and physical attractiveness "often account for a very
small percentage of variance in [subjective well-being]"); Eunkook Suh, Ed Diener & Frank
Fujita, Events and Subjective Well-Being: Only Recent Events Matter, 70 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1091, 1091 (1996) (citing other studies suggesting that life circumstances do not

affect happiness).
7. See, e.g., Richard E. Lucas, Time Does Not HealAll Wounds: A LongitudinalStudy of
Reaction and Adaptation to Divorce, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 945, 945 (2005) ("Although people

dread the prospect of becoming disabled, losing their job, or ending a relationship, much
existing research suggests that they will not suffer long-term emotional consequences from these
events."); see also Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELLBEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 302 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999);
Philip Brickman, Dan Coates & Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners andAccident Victims:
Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978).
8. In response to these findings, researchers hypothesized that people adapt
psychologically like they adapt physiologically. Just as people initially react strongly to certain
scents but soon learn to ignore the smell or initially react negatively to cold water but soon learn
to tolerate it, the emotional system adjusts to current life circumstances and events to return to
baseline levels. See generallyPhilip Brickman & Donald T. Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and
Planning the Good Society, in ADAPTATION-LEVEL THEORY: A SYMPOSIUM 287, 289 (M. H.
Appley ed., 197 1) (suggesting that individuals cannot sustain happiness over time because they
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The second finding is that people overestimate how long and much their future
affect (that is, their emotional states) will change in response to life events. 9 In other
words, people are poor forecasters of the duration and intensity of their own future
affect. Similarly, people do just as poorly when predicting how life events will impact
other people's affect.
In this article we want to quell this growing revolution. Our primary focus, however,
is more limited to the legal hedonists' attacks on jury awards for tort damages.' 0
Debates about the propriety of noneconomic tort awards have raged for decades. The
legal hedonists claim that the old argument that noneconomic awards are too large,
irrational, and unpredictable, 1' has new support from the science of happiness.
In light of the two findings described above, the legal hedonists' attack on the tort
system is predictable. 12 They argue first that noneconomic damages in tort-like
damages for pain, suffering, emotional distress, or loss of enjoyment of life-are
fleeting and illusory, because people adapt, and their happiness returns to its previous
levels. 13 Second, legal hedonists contend that just as individuals mispredict how those
injuries will impact their own happiness, so too will judges and jurors err when they try
to predict the unhappiness ofplaintiffs in assessing noneconomic damages. That is, in
part, judges and juries focus inappropriately only upon harms to plaintiffs, and they do
live on a "hedonic treadmill").
9. For overviews of affective forecasting, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the
Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting,80 IND. L.J. 155, 165-81 (2005); George
Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It be Nice? PredictingFuture Feelings, in WELLBEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 85; Timothy D. Wilson &
Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting,35 ADVANCES INEXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 345
(2003). See generally DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); TIMOTHY WILSON,
STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 137-58 (2002).
10. Compensatory tort damages (as distinguished from punitive or nominal tort damages)
are meant to restore an injured party to his or her preinjury position. Compensatory damages
restore both economic (or pecuniary) losses and noneconomic (or nonpecuniary) losses.
Economic losses include lost wages, loss of earning potential, and costs associated with medical
care and rehabilitation. Noneconomic losses compensate when there is no obvious external
objective measure for the loss. Noneconomic damage awards include compensation for pain,
suffering, mental distress, and loss of enjoyment of life. While there is little dispute about the
calculation of economic damages, noneconomic damages have engendered deep debate. See

infra Part III for a more fulsome definition ofnoneconomic damages, a deeper discussion of the
debate, and the legal hedonists' role in that debate.
Of course, tort victims may also receive punitive or nominal damages. Punitive damage
awards are granted as a means of punishing the defendant for outrageous conduct and deterring
future conduct, not as a means to return a plaintiffto an ex ante position. In contrast, nominal
damages are given as a symbolic award, and are designed to vindicate a right even if there is no
compensatory loss.
11.

EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

JURY AWARDS 23 (2003).
12. See Drake Bennett, Perfectly Happy, BOSTON GLOBE.COM, May 10, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/05/1 0/perfectlyhappy/.
13. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at S168 (stating "many apparently serious losses inflict
relatively little in the way of long-term hedonic harm"); Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 5, at
S205-07 (arguing that courts should not include as an element of damage awards any amount
that compensates for loss of happiness, because adaptation makes emotional changes as a result
of adverse events or life circumstances fleeting).
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not consider the way in which plaintiffs' lives change postinjury, the relative health of
the plaintiff, or the human capacity to adapt.14 As a result of these hedonic judgment
(or affective forecasting) errors, judges and juries systematically grant excessive
noneconomic damages.1 5
Rather than suffer these errors, the legal hedonists have different prescriptions.
Samuel Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger, for example, argue that damage awards for
loss of enjoyment of life should be eliminated because they "entrench the societal view
that disability is inherently tragic, and encourage people with disabilities to see their
lives as tragedies."' 6 Cass Sunstein, on the other hand, argues that because of
adaptation and affective forecasting errors, noneconomic awards are inherently
irrational and unpredictable.' 7 He claims the legal system should take the power to
grant these awards away from judges and juries and instead award hedonic damages
only from a "Civil Damages Schedule,"
constructed by experts and designed to
8
eliminate juror error from the process.'
Although these arguments parallel or replicate earlier arguments about noneconomic
tort awards, they have the potential to move the debate because the arguments are made
by pedigreed scholars and because the arguments are wrapped in a veneer of science.
There are, however, several problems with these arguments. First, they understate the
flexibility of the legal doctrines governing noneconomic tort awards. This problem
results partly from a definitional disjunction between what the legal hedonists mean
when they refer to noneconomic damages and what courts mean when they use that
term.' 9 Second, the arguments suffer from an empirically unjustified confidence in the
strength and ubiquity of adaptation. 20 Lastly, to whatever extent adaptation occurs, the
legal hedonists focus only upon the postadaptation positions of plaintiffs without any
regard for the preadaptation evaluations of plaintiffs' injuries. 21 In short, the new
science of happiness does not change the old debates, and, in fact, may twist the debate
in odd ways.
In Part I, we briefly describe the ways that social scientists are trying to measure
happiness and the primary objections to these measures. In Part II,
we reconsider the
early findings of the new science of happiness on which the legal hedonists rely. Based
on a number of recent studies that cast doubt upon these early findings, we conclude
that the legal hedonists rely on overstated and undertheorized data. In Part III, we
return to the legal system. We show that the definition of noneconomic damages used
to support the legal hedonists' arguments is at variance with the definitions used by
courts and juries to describe pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. We conclude

14. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at S174.
15. See id. at S158. This claim, of course, is simply the observation that people make
affective forecasting errors as a result of adaptation neglect and the focusing illusion of the
litigation system. Id.
16. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 5, at 773. They do not, however, believe that
nonpecuniary damage awards are too high. Rather they argue that certain types of damages,
those for loss of enjoyment of life, are unnecessary in light of hedonic adaptation. Id.
at 773-74.
17. Sunstein, supra note 5, at S158, S184-86.
18. Id.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part IV.
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that scholars calling for the demise of jury awards understate the nuance that courts
ascribe to noneconomic damages.
In Part IV, we consider whether the research on hedonic adaptation and affective
forecasting really casts doubt on jury awards for noneconomic damages. Lastly, we
consider the implications for the new science of happiness in the reformation of legal
institutions. Although this research may aid institutions and individuals in creating and
sustaining happiness, 22 we believe that we should be more cautious when applying
these findings to public policy. In particular, we do not believe that research based on
adaptation is ready for prime time.
I. DEFINING AND MEASURING HAPPINESS
Before we move on to discuss our concerns with the legal hedonists' attacks on tort
damage awards, it is useful to take a step backward and consider how social scientists
measure happiness.
Social scientists studying happiness use several measurement methodologies. The
most common technique is to ask subjects to self-report their emotional state. This
requires subjects to experience the emotion, accurately reflect on the emotional state,
and properly express that reflection. 23 There are a number of ways to gather selfreported data. Some techniques, for instance, use single or periodic surveys to assess a
subject's overall emotional state at a certain point in time. For instance, Ed Diener
popularized the Satisfaction with Life Scale, where individuals are asked to rate on a
seven-point scale the degree to which they agree or disagree with five related
statements: "In most ways my life is close to my ideal"; "[t]he conditions of my life are
excellent"; "I am satisfied with my life"; "[s]o far I have gotten the important things24I
want in life"; and "If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing."
Alternatively, researchers measure subjective well-being with a single question, such
as: "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?"
or "[t]aken
all together, would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too
25
happy?

22. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Peter H. Huang, PositiveParentalism,NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 26, 2009, at 27, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id =
1202427700551 (advocating doing so).
23. See Randy J. Larsen & Barbara L. Fredrickson, Measurement Issues in Emotion
Research, in WELL-BEING: THE FoUNDATIoNs OF HEDONIc PsYcHoLoGY, supranote 7, at 40,44.
24. Ed Diener, Robert A. Emmons, Randy J.Larsen & Sharon Griffin, The Satisfaction
with Life Scale, 49 J.PERSONALrry ASSESSMENT 71, 72 tbl. 1 (1985).
25. See Alan B. Krueger & David A. Schkade, The Reliability of Subjective Well-Being
Measures, 92 J. PuB. EcoN. 1833, 1835-36 (2008) [hereinafter Krueger & Schkade, Reliability]

(providing an overview of the literature).
A related line of research measures how much time people report experiencing various
positive and negative feelings. Nancy Folbre, Time Use and Living Standards, 93 Soc.

INDICATORs REs. 77 (2009); Daniel S.Hamermesh, It's Time to "Do Economics " with TimeUse Data, 93 Soc. INDICATORS REs. 65 (2009); Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger,
Developments in the Measurement ofSubjective Well-Being, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2006, at 3,
18-22 [hereinafter Kahneman & Krueger, Developments];Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman,

Claude Fischler, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. Stone, Time Use andSubjective
Well-Being in Franceand the US., 93 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 7 (2009); Alan B. Krueger, Are
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Other survey techniques minimize the impact that memory plays in assessing
happiness by gathering temporally specific data about the subject. The gold standard
for measuring real-time emotion is the Experience Sampling Method Participants are
prompted at random times throughout the day to record what they are doing and how
they feel. Although expensive and difficult to implement, this method minimizes the
impact of faulty memory on the results. The Day Reconstruction Method ("DRM")
attempts to minimize both costs and the impact of memory on survey techniques.
Social scientists using DRM ask participants to retrospectively categorize and
summarize a day's worth of events on a number of different scales.26
These self-reported measures are occasionally supplemented or supplanted by
objective observations of the subject's emotional state by interested or disinterested
third parties or trained observers to code emotions.27 Other researchers are using
modem technology to measure neural activity to assess happiness.28
The self-report methods are the dominant feature in the happiness literature, with
survey data leading the way. While easily implemented, these techniques raise certain
reliability and validity concerns. That is, (1) are subjects reporting their "true"
emotional states and beliefs about their overall well-being, and (2) can these results be
replicated by a third party? In the remainder of this Part, we address the major
categories of concern and the responses of hedonic researchers.
A. Definitions and Validity
The first concern about measuring happiness might come from the fact that there is
no clear agreed upon definition of happiness or well-being. For instance, some may
think-as Jeremy Bentham and Thomas Hobbes believed-that happiness lies in the
pursuit of pleasure, sensation, and human appetites. 29 Alternatively, some may think of
happiness as well-being or "the expression of virtue-that is, in doing what is worth
doing."30 Put differently, happiness may be thought of as well-being, and for Aristotle,
well-being was found in eudaimonia,flourishing, and fulfilling your true nature as a

We Having More Fun Yet? Categorizing and Evaluating Changes in Time Allocation, 2
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVrrY 193 (2007) [hereinafter Krueger, More Fun]; Alan B.
Krueger et al., National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life, in NATIONAL TIME
ACCOUNTING & SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING (Alan B. Krueger ed., forthcoming 2009); George
Loewenstein, That Which Makes Life Worthwhile, in NATIONAL TIME ACCOUNTING &
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING (Alan B. Krueger ed., forthcoming 2009); William Michelson, On
Adding Affect to Time-DiaryAccounts, 93 Soc. INDICATORS RES. 31 (2009).

26. Kruger & Schkade, Reliability, supra note 25, at 1834.
27. See Larsen & Frederickson, supra note 23, at 50.
28. Richard J. Davidson, Well-Being and Affective Style: Neural Substrates and
BiobehavioralCorrelates,359 PHIL.

TRANSACTIONS ROYAL

SOC'Y B 1395 (2004).

29. See Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, On Happiness and Human Potentials:A
Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 141,
143-44 (2001) ("[Thomas] Hobbes argued that happiness lies in the successful pursuit of our

human appetites, and [the Marquis] DeSade believed that pursuit of sensation and pleasure is
the ultimate goal of life. Utilitarian philosophers such as Bentham argued that it is through
individuals' attempting to maximize pleasure and self-interest that the good society is built.").
30. Id. at 145; see Valerie Tiberius, Well-Being: PsychologicalResearchforPhilosophers,
5 PHIL. COMPASS 493, 494 (2006).
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human being. 31 Still others believe that "a person would not be said to be living a good
life, no matter how psychologically happy she was, unless her life met a certain moral
standard., 32 Whether one is happy or flourishing is irrelevant. What matters is how
one's life stacks up against an objective list of things worth doing.
These distinctions are not unique to philosophy. Psychologists fare no better at
narrowing the definition of happiness; indeed, in large part they follow a similar
taxonomy as philosophers.33 In addition, psychologists consider the differences among
the temporal measures of happiness: affect, mood, and life satisfaction. Affect refers to
an experience of a feeling or an emotion. Affect can have a positive or negative
valence and includes both states of high and low arousal.34 The word "mood," in

31. Tiberius, supra note 30, at 494.
32. Id.
33. See id.("The research programs in social and personality psychology correspond
roughly to the divisions among philosophical theories."). Psychologists Martin Seligman and
Edward B. Royzman, for instance, classified traditional theories of happiness into three

categories: (1) hedonism, which views happiness as experiencing positive subjective feelings;
(2) desire theory, which views happiness as fulflling subjective desires; and (3) objective list
theory, which views happiness as achieving items from some objective list of worthwhile
pursuits or things. See Martin E. P. Seligman & Ed Royzman, Happiness:The Three Traditional
Theories, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS, July 2003, http://www.authentichappiness.sas.upenn.edu/
newsletter.aspx?id=49. Seligman introduced the concept of authentic happiness to try to
combine all three traditional theories of happiness. "Authentic happiness comes from identifying
and cultivating your most fundamental strengths and using them every day in work, love, play,
and parenting." MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: USING THE NEW POSITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY TO REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING FULFILLMENT, at xiii (2002).
What is authentic about authentic happiness is that "[w]hen well-being comes from engaging
our strengths and virtues, our lives are imbued with authenticity." Id.at 9. Authentic happiness
is thus about more than just experiencing a string of moments that feel good. An example of
authentic happiness is being engaged in some activity that is valued, regardless of the presence
or absence of positive subjective feelings. Christopher Peterson, Nansook Park & Martin E. P.
Seligman, Orientationsto Happinessand Life Satisfaction:The Full Life Versus the Empty Life,
6 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 25, 27 (2005). Authentic happiness conceives of three kinds of happy
lives: a pleasant life, pursuing pleasurable feelings; a good life, utilizing one's character
strengths to achieve gratification and engagement; and a meaningful life, utilizing one's
character strengths in the service of something larger than oneself. SELIGMAN, supra,at 262-63;
Seligman & Royzman, supra.A full life is a life that is at once pleasant, good, and meaningful.
So, authentic happiness combines all three theories in the sense that a pleasant life conceives of
happiness in a hedonic sense, a good life conceives of happiness in a desire sense, and a
meaningful life conceives of happiness in an objective list sense. See generallyPeter H. Huang
& Rick Swedloff, Authentic Happiness& Meaning at Law Firms, 58 SYRACUSE L. REv. 335,
345-46 (2008).
34. James A. Russell, A Circumplex Model ofAffect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1161, 1163-64 (1980) (describing the circumplex model of affect, which graphically depicts
affect living inside a two dimensional plane with the horizontal axis depicting the valence
dimension and the vertical axis indicating the arousal dimension). For example, happiness can

refer to such "yippy skippy" notions as excitement and exuberance and such contemplative and
meditative conceptions as contentment and serenity. Excitement and meditation might both
produce positive valence to affect, but would be in opposite quadrants of an arousal scale. See
id. at 1165-67.
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contrast, means a relatively long-lasting affective or emotional state. Moods tend to be
less specific, usually less intense, less likely to be triggered by specific events or
stimuli, and longer lasting than emotions. 35 A person's "life satisfaction" measures a
person's own perceived level of subjective well-being. In contrast to affect or mood,
life satisfaction asks people to assess their lives as a whole.
Parenting illustrates aptly how affect, mood, and life satisfaction differ because the
same activity or episode of parenting can entail self-reported measures of affect, mood,
and life satisfaction that differ in their valence, intensity, or arousal. For example, few
parents want to be awakened by a screaming baby in the middle of the night. This
awakening could induce an immediate feeling of anger or annoyance. Such an episode
could raise anxiety about the lack of sleep or countless other negative emotions.
Simultaneously, a parent could be in a reasonably good mood for days before or after
that event. Even during the event itself, despite causing some disruption in mood, the
screaming baby cannot dampen excitement over a new job, or a feeling of
accomplishment from a home-repair project. Moreover, even though taking care of a
screaming baby may not create positive affect, simply holding the child might increase
overall life satisfaction; and successfully getting a baby to stop crying and screaming
may increase a parent's overall feeling of well-being. Parenting is an activity that also
illustrates the36 difference between feelings-based and thoughts-based components of
experiences.
Given the multiplicity of definitions, it is unclear what test subjects are reporting
when they answer questions about happiness and well-being. For instance, a heroin
addict who just got her fix may report a high level of happiness and life satisfaction.
But is this a valid definition of happiness? Certainly, this reporting gives some scholars
concern about the validity of the data.3 7 But those studying happiness respond by
arguing that happiness is not objective, it is subjective-each person defines the
characteristics of a good life. According to Ed Diener, "[t]his subjective definition of
quality of life is democratic in that it grants to each individual the right to decide
whether his or her life is worthwhile." 38 Therefore, according to such researchers, each
individual is capable of answering for herself how happy she is. She and only she can
tell us her "subjective well-being."

35. ROBERT E. THAYER, THE BIOPSYCHOLOGY OF MOOD AND ARousAL 14 (1989).
36. Mathew P. White & Paul Dolan, Accountingfor the Richness of Daily Activities, 20
PSYCHOL. SC. 1000, 1001, 1003 fig. 1, 1004 fig.2, 1005 tbl.2 (2009) (providing data finding that

that while survey respondents rated time with children as being relatively low in pleasure, they
nonetheless thought of time with children as being rewarding and hence contributing to overall
subjective well-being).
37. See Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happinessand a Proposalfora
National Index, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 34, 35-36 (2000); see also Jan Cornelius Ott, Happiness,
Economics and Public Policy: A Critique, J. HAPPINESS STUD. (2008),
http://www.springerlink.com/content/f4088110p 13649k5/fulltext.pdfpage= 1.
38. Diener, supranote 37, at 34; see also Jacolyn M. Norrish & Dianne A. Vella-Brodrick,
Is the Study of Happinessa Worthy Scientific Pursuit?, 87 Soc.
(2007).
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B. Bias andReliability

Even if surveys perfectly captured all of the meanings ofhappiness and test subjects
completely understood the researchers' questions, there would still be concerns about
whether the measures capture unbiased reports. Not surprisingly, measures of
subjective well-being and other hedonic measures can be contaminated by a number of
biases. For instance, (1) people can exaggerate their self-reported subjective wellbeing; (2) global and overall assessments of happiness are unduly influenced by
momentary fluctuations in mood that result from weather or finding a dime on a
photocopier before responding to questionnaires; 39 (3) people have an automatic
tendency to normalize their answers to questions based upon implicit norms of
comparison;4 and (4) even question order in multiquestion surveys can influence
reported answers. 4 1 Questions that use these "bounded labeled scales"--such as a
seven-point semantic differential scale ranging from very unhappy (one) to very happy
(seven) or a three-category scale consisting of not too satisfied(one), satisfied (two),
and very satisfied (three)-are susceptible to a measurement bias: a tendency to
renorm-that is, interpret those scales differently in different contexts. Hence, they will
not differentiate between actual and spurious relativisms. 4 2 Thus, there is some concern

that data collection methods are unreliable.
These concerns, however, are minimized in other ways. For instance, one can
assume that positive and negative momentary fluctuations in affect are equally
represented in the sample. By increasing the sample size, researchers can moderate the
impact of these momentary influences. Further, by using consistent survey questions
and surveys, researchers can minimize concerns about question order.
Moreover, a number of empirical findings provide support for the reliability of
happiness data. First, there is empirical data indicating that self-reported happiness is
43
positively correlated with observable positive behavior such as Duchenne smiling,
and verifiable neurological activity, such as greater left than right superior frontal brain

39. Norbert Schwarz & Fritz Strack, Evaluating One's Life: A Judgment Model of
Subjective Well-Being, in SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 27

(Fritz Strack, Michael Argyle & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1991).
40. Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its
Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136 (1986).
41. See generally Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, HappinessInequality in the United
States, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S33 (2008).
42. Christopher K. Hsee & Judy Ningyu Tang, Sun and Water: On a Modulus-Based
Measurement of Happiness, 7 EMOTION 213 (2007). Two psychologists proposed a simple
paper-and-pencil-friendly modulus-based scale of happiness to minimize such bias. Id
43. Paul Ekman, Richard J. Davidson & Wallace V. Friesen, The Duchenne Smile:
Emotional Expression and Brain Physiology 11, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 342
(1990) (demonstrating that self-reports of happiness are correlated with Duchene smiles, which
are smiles that involve orbicularis oculi muscles near our eyes); Paul Ekman, Wallace V. Friesen
& Maureen O'Sullivan, Smiles When Lying, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414 (1988)
(finding that subtle differences in aspects of facial expression differentiated types of smiling);
Kahneman & Krueger, Developments, supra note 25, at 9, tbl. 1.But see Eva G. Krumhuber &
Anthony S.R. Mansted, Can Duchenne Smiles be Feigned? New Evidence on Felt and Fasle
Smiles, 9 EMOTION 807 (2009) (raising doubts concerning the reliability and validity of
Duchenne smiles and questioning their use to identify genuine feelings of happiness).
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activation. 44 Second, empirical happiness research data is consistent with expected
correlations, such as findings that income and happiness are correlated; 45 health and
happiness are correlated; 4 6 trust and happiness are correlated; 47 and unemployment and
unhappiness are correlated. 48 Third, a pair of economists recently tested for the
reliability of subjective well-being measures over a two week period in a sample of 229
employed women and found that both overall life satisfaction and experienced affect
derived from the DRM had tested and retested serial correlations ranging from 0.50 to
0.70. 49 In particular, the correlation of responses about net affect (which is defined as
duration-weighted positive affect less negative affect) taken two weeks apart was
0.64.50 The correlation of responses about life satisfaction taken two weeks apart was
0.59. 51

Given this research, most social scientists believe that hedonic research is reliable
and consistent. For example, George Loewenstein and Peter Ubel and their various
coauthors conducted research which: (1) tested for and could not find any evidence that
Parkinson's disease patients exaggerated their subjective well-being; 52 (2) tested for
and found identical patterns of both adaptation and underprediction of such adaptation
for both global and momentary subjective well-being measures; 3 and (3) tested for and
found existence of scale recalibration,14 but also misprediction of affect, even after

44. Nathan A. Fox & Richard J. Davidson, Patternsof Brain ElectricalActivity During
FacialSigns of Emotion in 1O-Month-OldInfants, 24 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 230 (1988)
(finding that ten-month-old infants display greater activation of their left rather than right frontal
area of their brains upon seeing videotapes of actresses exhibiting happy facial expressions);
Heather L. Urry, Jack B. Nitschke, Isa Dolski, Daren C. Jackson, Kim M. Dalton, Corrina J.
Mueller, Melissa A. Rosenkranz, Carol D. Ryff, Burton H. Singer & Richard J. Davidson,
Making a Life Worth Living: Neural Correlatesof Well-Being, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 367 (2004)
(finding that for a sample of eighty-four adults ranging in age from fifty-seven to sixty higher
self-reported happiness was correlated with greater left than right superior frontal activation).
45. Angus Deaton, Income, Health, and Well-Being Around the World: Evidencefrom the
Gallup World Poll,J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2008, at 53 (finding based upon data from 132
countries that a strong relationship between average life satisfaction and per capita national
income, and high-income countries report greater life-satisfaction than low-income countries).
46. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Hypertension and Happiness Across
Nations, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 218 (2008) (finding that happier nations report systematically

lower levels of hypertension based upon data from sixteen countries).
47. John F. Helliwell, How's Life? Combining Individual and National Variables to
Explain Subjective Well-Being, 20 EcoN. MODELING 331 (2003) (finding, based upon data from
fifty countries, that happiness and social capital are related).
48. See, e.g., Lucas et al., supra note 6.
49. Krueger & Schkade, Reliability, supra note 25, at 1843.
50. Id. at 1833.

51. Id.
52. Dylan M. Smith, Norbert Schwarz, Todd R. Roberts & Peter A. Ubel, Why Are You
Calling Me? How Study IntroductionsChange Response Patterns, 15 QUALITY LIFE REs. 621

(2006).
53. Jason Riis, George Loewenstein, Jonathon Baron, Christopher Jepson, Angela Fagerlin,
& Peter A. Ubel, Ignoranceof HedonicAdaptation to Hemodialysis:A Study UsingEcological
Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 3 (2005).
54. Peter A. Ubel, Aleksandra Jankovic, Dylan Smith, Kenneth M. Langa & Angela
Fagerlin, What is Perfect Health to an 85-Year-Old?: Evidence for Scale Recalibration in
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controlling for that scale recalibration. 5 5 Based upon data from these and other studies
that Loewenstein and Ubel have conducted, they concluded "that the surprising
emotional stability people show across a wide range of circumstances reflects true
adaptation to those circumstances and is not a mere result of response bias or scale
recalibration." 56

In the end, it may be that we are stuck with a thin measure of happiness, which only
takes into account a subjective evaluation of momentary affect and subjective wellbeing. This measurement may suffice for some projects, but may not suffice for
measuring tort damages. We will return to this theme later in the paper. For our
purposes here, we accept that it is possible to reliably measure happiness and that these
measurements have something to tell us about the human condition.
II. ADAPTATION AND AFFECTIVE FORECASTING
With these measurement issues in mind, we can now return to the legal hedonists'
central arguments. They argue that, on the one hand, pain, suffering, and loss of
enjoyment of life are illusory or fleeting injuries, because individuals will adapt to any
negative emotional or physical state. On the other hand, they assume that jurors are
incapable of granting these damages, because they cannot adequately predict the
impact of the injury on the individuals.
The legal hedonists' arguments rely on a broad belief in the strength, power, and
importance of hedonic adaptation. In this Part, we take a closer look at hedonic
adaptation and pay particular attention to the meaning and measurement of happiness.
We first lay out the history of the research on hedonic adaptation and the recent studies
that undermine the earlier findings. We then return to a discussion of affective
forecasting.
A. Early Theory and Evidence of Hedonic Adaptation

In its broadest sense, adaptation "refers to any action, process, or mechanism that
reduces the effects (perceptual, physiological, attentional, motivational, hedonic, and
so on) of a constant or repeated stimulus. '5 7 When a person steps from a dark building
to the bright sunlight, he will likely squint and turn away from the sun, his pupils will
contract, and neural processes will allow his brain to understand the information in the
new setting. 58 Each of these behaviors is part of the adaptive physiological process

Subjective Health Ratings, 43 MED. CARE 1054 (2005).

55. Heather P. Lacey, George Loewenstein, Jason Riis, Angela Fagerlin, Dylan M. Smith &
Peter A. Ubel, Are They Really Happy? Exploring Scale Recalibrationin Estimates of WellBeing, 27 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 669, 673-74 (2008).
56. George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision
and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PuB. ECON. 1795, 1801 (2008).
57. Frederick & Loewenstein, supranote 7, at 302.
58. See id.
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people use in reaction to bright light. 59 Hedonic adaptation is the
notion that people
60
will also adapt to stimuli that are relevant to emotion or affect.
Psychologists have long hypothesized that physiological and psychological
adaptation serve important evolutionary and biological functions. First, researchers
theorized that adaptation protects humans by reducing the physiological and
psychological impact of external stimuli. 61 People sweat to reduce the impact of heat;
our eyes dilate to reduce the impact of the sun. Similarly, our emotions may adapt to
protect our bodies from "dangerous physiological and psychological reactions that
occur with prolonged emotional states., 62 Hedonic states (hunger, thirst, pain,
excitement, contentment) may guide humans to needs such as food or companionship.63
But prolonged periods in an excited emotional state could cause metabolic disease,
hypertension, ulcers, or suppression of the immune system. 64 Thus, according to this
theory, individuals must adapt to prevent such damage. Second, adaptation protects
humans by ensuring that changes in our environment receive our appropriate
immediate attention. In general terms, stimuli that have existed in an individual's
environment are likely to pose less of a threat than new stimuli, which require greater
attention. In other words, one becomes habituated to the old stimuli and reacts more
strongly to new stimuli.65 The same may be true for emotional stimuli. Over time, old
stimuli receive less attention and are less important.
For these reasons, scholars long predicted the phenomenon and process of hedonic
adaptation, but had no strong empirical support. In 1978, Philip Brickman and two
coauthors set out to find that missing empirical data. In the oft-cited article, Lottery
Winners andAccident Victims: Is HappinessRelative?,66 the authors found that lottery
winners and controls did not significantly differ in their self-reported past, present, and
future happiness ratings.67 Brickman and his coauthors conducted short interviews with
twenty-two winners of major lotteries, twenty-nine paralyzed accident victims, and
twenty-two control subjects.68 They found that lottery winners and controls did not
69
significantly differ in their self-reported past, present, and future happiness ratings.
But, the study revealed that accident victims and controls did significantly differ in
their past and present, but not future self-reported happiness ratings. 70 In particular, the
study found that accident victims exhibited a nostalgia effect of recalling their past as

59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 303.
62. Richard E. Lucas, Long-Term Disability Is Associated with Lasting Changes in
Subjective Well-Being: Evidencefrom Two Nationally RepresentativeLongitudinalStudies, 92
J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 717, 718 (2007).

63. See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 303.
64. Id. As 1978 economics Nobel laureate Herbert Simon pointed out, emotions focus our

attention upon a specific item from a vast sea of sensory inputs and help direct and prioritize our
scarce decision-making resources to address particular tasks requiring completion. Herbert A.
Simon, Motivationaland Emotional Controls of Cognition, 74 PSYCHOL. REv. 29 (1967).
65. Lucas, supra note 62, at 718.

66. Brickman et al., supra note 7.
67. Id. at 920, 921 tbl.1.
68. Id. at 917.
69. Id. at 920, 921 tbl.1.

70. Id.
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having been happier than controls did. 7 1 The authors of the study themselves
emphasized, "that the paraplegic rating of present happiness is still above the midpoint
of the scale and that the accident victims did not appear nearly as unhappy as might
have been expected. 72 From this, Brickman and his colleagues concluded that
individuals adapt to bad and good events and mispredict the impact that these events
will have on their future happiness.
But the Brickman study has deep methodological problems. As the authors
themselves conceded:
[O]ur data are sharply limited by the fact that they were obtained at a single point
in time and do not trace out the hypothetical temporal course of adaptation. When
we broke down our sample by the time that had elapsed since the lottery or the
accident, we found no changes in their ratings.... A larger study, preferably
longitudinal, is needed to specify the exact
parameters that determine how
73
adaptation level effects change over time.
Despite the fact that this study was a small sample and had significant methodological
challenges, it inspired a new generation of scholars to think critically about happiness
and to claim that people adapt to pleasant and unpleasant life circumstances. Early
researchers, using the same cross-sectional methodology confirmed Bricklnan's
findings of adaptation. 74 Studies showed adaptation to, among other things,
parapalegia, 75 loss of limbs by child and adolescent cancer victims,

76

dialysis, 77 and

78

loss of loved ones.
From this early theory and research on adaptation, scholars concluded that
individuals have set levels of happiness that have little correlation to their life
circumstances. 79 Further, they concluded that individuals deviate from those set levels

71. Id.at 921.
72. Id. at 921. They also noted that because:
10 paraplegics refused to answer the question of future happiness (versus 3

winners and 1 control), the results for this question must be viewed most
cautiously. If refusal to answer represents apprehension, inclusion of these

respondents would have lowered the victim mean and perhaps the winner mean
relative to the control group.
Id.
73. Id. at 924.
74. Lucas, supra note 62, at 718-19 (reviewing the primary studies claiming to support

adaptation).
75. Camille B. Wortman & Roxane Cohen Silver, Coping with Irrevocable Loss, in 6
&
Brenda K. Bryant eds., 1987).
76. Vida L. Tyc, Psychological Adaptation of Children and Adolescents with Limb
Deficiencies:A Review, 12 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REv. 275 (1992).
77. Riis et al., supra note 53.
78. See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 312-13 (reviewing literature).
79. Researchers describe this adaptive ability alternatively as the hedonic treadmill, see
Brickman & Campbell, supra note 8, at 289; the happiness set point, see DIENER & BISWASDIENER, supra note 1, at 145-46; a psychological immune system, see Daniel T. Gilbert,
CATACLYSMS, CRISES AND CATASTROPHES: PSYCHOLOGY IN ACTION 189 (Gary R. VandenBos

Elizabeth C. Pinel, Timothy D. Wilson, Stephen J. Blumberg & Thalia P. Wheatley, Immune
Neglect. A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting,75 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.

2010]

TORTDAMAGES AND THE NEW SCIENCE OF HAPPINESS

567

based on exogenous events but return after some period of adaptation. In short, these
scholars concluded that hedonic adaptation is "inevitable, and
no change in life
80
circumstance should ever lead to lasting changes in happiness.',
B. Beyond Brickman: A More Thorough Look atAdaptation
Much has changed since Brickman and his coauthors conducted their original study
of a small number of lottery winners and accident victims. For one thing, using the
same method as those early studies, researchers have found that adaptation is not as
universal as once believed. Second, using nationally representative panel data,
researchers have been able to track adaptation over time. These longitudinal studies
report that adaptation is not as complete as previously claimed. More importantly, even
where there is evidence of hedonic adaptation, later studies have shown that injured
individuals would still prefer to live without injury. In this part, we review this recent
research and consider the ramifications on the theories of adaptation.
1. Ubiquity of Adaptation
First, a number of studies have concluded that adaptation is not ubiquitous. Even
those who believe strongly in adaptation concede that individuals do not adapt to
certain to injuries or disorders that cause chronic pain or result in progressive and
degenerative disorders, such as rheumatoid arthritis or multiple sclerosis. 8 1 "[Ijn
contrast to paralysis victims, whose condition is likely to remain constant over time,
sufferers of such debilitating diseases must cope not only with the disabilities resulting
from the cumulative deterioration they have thus far suffered but with new impairments
as their disease progresses." 82 Perhaps surprisingly, there is also evidence that if an
individual holds out some hope of recovering from a severe injury, the individual does
not adapt to that injury. 83 That is, even the prospect ofrecovery can impede adaptation.
Researchers have similarly found evidence that individuals do not adapt in
noninjury domains. 84 Recent studies have concluded that individuals who get
PSYCHOL. 617, 621-33 (1998); or simply as hedonic adaptation, see Frederick & Loewenstein,

supra note 7. But each of these theories contains the same core set of beliefs, namely, that
individuals have a level of happiness that has little correlation to their life circumstances and
that individuals may deviate from that level based on exogenous events, but return after some
period of adaptation.
80. Ed Diener, Richard E. Lucas & Christine Napa Scollon, Beyond the Hedonic Treadmill:
Revising the Adaptation Theory of Well-Being, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 305, 308 (2006).
81. Frederick & Loewenstein, supranote 7, at 312; Richard F. Antonak & Hanoch Livneh,
Psychosocial Adaptation to Disability and Its Investigation Among Persons with Multiple
Sclerosis,40 Soc. ScI. & MED. 1099 (1995) (reviewing literature about psychosocial adaptation
to disability among individuals with multiple sclerosis, identifying research problems, and
suggesting future research); Craig A. Smith & Kenneth A. Wallston, Adaptation in Patientswith
Chronic Rheumatoid Arthritis: Application of a General Model, 11 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 151
(1992) (suggesting existence of a vicious cycle of helplessness appraisals, passive coping with
pain, and psychosocial impairment preventing adaptation to rheumatoid arthritis).
82. Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 312.
83. See id.; Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 5, at S199, S199 n.2.
84. Richard E. Lucas, Adaptation andthe Set-PointModel of Subjective Well-Being: Does
Happiness Change After Major Life Events?, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIoNs PSYCHOL. SCI. 75 (2007).
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divorced,8 5 become unemployed,86 lose a loved one, 7 or win the lottery, 8 on average,
do not return to their previous happiness levels; instead, such individuals experience
significant, lasting changes in their subjective well-being.
Likewise, based upon longitudinal data, two economists recently concluded that
people do not adapt completely to money. Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers

85. Lucas, supra note 7. Here, Lucas tracked data from a longitudinal eighteen-year panel
study of more than 30,000 Germans and found that satisfaction drops as one approaches divorce
and then gradually rebounds over time. Id. But the return to happiness baselines is not complete.
Furthermore, the association between divorce and life satisfaction results from both preexisting
differences in people and lasting changes following divorce. Id.
86. See, e.g., FREY, supra note 1, at 45-53 (summarizing how unemployment affects
happiness). An early study of British people offered econometric regression evidence that is
consistent with the common-sense notion that being unemployed is a major economic source of
human distress and psychiatric stress. See Andrew E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, Unhappiness
and Unemployment, 104 ECON. J. 648 (1994). The authors of this groundbreaking study
concluded that "joblessness depresse[d] well-being more than any other single characteristic
(including important negative ones such as divorce and separation)." Id. at 655.
Another longitudinal study found that not only current unemployment, but also past
unemployment, reduces the current well-being of individuals, whether those individuals are
presently employed or not. See Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis & Peter Sanfey, Scarring:
The PsychologicalImpact ofPast Unemployment, 68 ECONOMICA 221 (200 1)[hereinafter Clark
et al., Scarring]. In other words, past unemployment has a psychologically scarring effect on
people, regardless of whether or when they regain employment. A fifteen-year longitudinal
study also found that, on average, the people studied never completely returned to their preunemployment levels of satisfaction, even after they were reemployed; moreover, in contrast
with expectations from adaptation theories, individuals who had been unemployed in the past
did not react any less negatively to a new bout of unemployment. See Lucas et al., supranote 6.
Three large-scale European longitudinal studies also found little evidence of habituation to
unemployment in Europe in the 1990s. See Andrew E. Clark, A Note on Unhappiness and
Unemployment Duration,52 APPLIED EcoN. Q. 291 (2006). Finally, two studies based upon data
for over a quarter of a million people across twelve European countries and the United States
found that average self-reported happiness is negatively correlated across time with just the rates
of unemployment and inflation, and that unemployment is more harmful than inflation in terms
of reducing subjective well-being. See Rafael Di Tella, Robert J. MacCulloch & Andrew J.
Oswald, Preferencesover Inflation and Unemployment: Evidencefrom Surveys of Happiness,
91 AM. ECON. REv. 335 (2001); Rafael Di Tella, Robert J. MacCulloch & Andrew J. Oswald,
The Macroeconomicsof Happiness, 85 REv. EcON. & STAT. 809 (2003); see also Clark et al.,
Scarring,supra.
87. See Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the
Calculation of Compensatory Damages, 38 J. LEGAL STuD. 217S (2008) (examining the
amounts of mental distress that bereavement causes and finding that the death of a spouse causes
the most distress, followed by the death of a child, then the death of a parent).
88. See Jonathan Gardner & Andrew J. Oswald, Money and Mental Well-Being: A
LongitudinalStudy of Medium-Sized Lottery Wins, 26 J. HEALTH ECON. 49 (2007). Gardner and
Oswald tracked a random sample of 137 British individuals longitudinally and compared those
who had won medium-sized lottery amounts of between £1,000 and £120,000 (up to
approximately $200,000) with two control groups, those who had won nothing and those who
had won small amounts. The study concluded that those who had won medium-sized lottery
amounts exhibited statistically significant better psychological health and mental well-being
improvements two years after winning.

2010]

TORT DAMAGES AND THE NEW SCIENCE OFHAPPINESS

569

analyzed multiple, rich datasets and established a significant positive link between
gross domestic product and average levels of subjective well-being across countries. 9
In addition, their analysis found no evidence of a satiation level of national income
90
beyond which wealthier countries have no further increases in subjective well-being.
They also demonstrated a powerful role for economic growth in raising happiness upon
reexamining the relationship between changes in subjective well-being and income
over time within countries. Finally, they showed that national income is correlated
positively with not just happiness, but also such other indicators and types of positive

89. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being:
Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECoN. ACTIvrry 1 (2008).
Stevenson's and Wolfers's studies are a reaction to the research of Richard Easterlin, who
initially raised and investigated the related question of whether raising the incomes of all
increases the happiness of all. See Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the
Human Lot? Some EmpiricalEvidence, in NATIONS AND HOuSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH:
ESSAYS INHONOR OF MOSES ABRAMOVITZ 89 (Paul A. David & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1974);
Richard A. Easterlin, Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?, 27 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 35 (1995). His answer became famously known as the Easterlin paradox,
the claim that no link exists between a society's level of economic development and the average
level of happiness in that society. Moreover, Easterlin found a satiation level of national income
beyond which a nation experienced no further increase in average subjective well-being. Lastly,
Easterlin declared that he found no evidence that, for any fixed point in time, higher levels of
national income are correlated with higher levels of average subjective well-being. These
assertions become even more surprising upon realizing that, for any fixed moment in time and in
any particular country, richer individuals are happier than poorer ones.
Easterlin's "paradox quickly became a social science classic, cited in academic journals and
the popular media. It tapped into a near-spiritual human instinct to believe that money can't buy
happiness. As a 2006 headline in The Financial Times said, 'The Hippies Were Right All Along
About Happiness."' David Leonhardt, Money Doesn't Buy Happiness. Well, on Second
Thought..., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at C1. A veritable cottage industry of literature sprouted
up attempting to explain Easterlin's paradox. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger,
David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. Stone, Would You Be Happier If You Were
Richer? A Focusing Illusion, 312 SCl. 1908 (2006). Three of the leading explanations for
Easterlin's paradox appeal to: (1) hedonic adaptation due to being on a hedonic treadmill, (2)
happiness depends on relative as opposed to absolute income levels, or (3) happiness depends
upon omitted variables that represent nonincome factors. See Robert H. Frank, Should Public
Policy Respond to PositionalExternalities?,92 J.PuB. EcON. 1777 (2008). Compare Stephen
Wu, Adapting to HeartConditions:A Test of the Hedonic Treadmill,20 J. HEALTH ECON. 495
(2001), with Andrew E. Clark, Paul Frijters & Michael A. Shields, Relative Income, Happiness
and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles, 46 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 95 (2008), and Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Gross NationalHappiness
as an Answer to the Easterlin Paradox?, 86 J. DEv. ECON. 22 (2008). The widespread
acceptance of Easterlin's empirical conclusions had led many to question policies fostering
economic growth. See, e.g., Carol Graham, Insights on Developmentfrom the Economics of
Happiness, 20 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 201 (2005); Christopher K. Hsee, Reid Hastie &
Jingqiu Chen, Hedonomics: BridgingDecision Research with HappinessResearch, 3 PERSP.
PSYCHOL. Sci. 224 (2008).
90. Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 89; see also Angus Deaton, Income, Health, and
Well-Being Around the World: Evidencefrom the Gallup World Poll, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring
2008, at 53, 55 (providing related findings); Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, The Paradox
of Declining FemaleHappiness, 1 AM. ECON. J. 190 (2009).
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affect, such as smiling and laughing, but appears uncorrelated to worry, sadness,
boredom, depression, or anger.9'
Although each of these various domains is interesting for purposes of evaluating the
92
ubiquity of adaptation, unemployment and money are of particular importance here.
This is because people who become severely disabled as the result of a tort are often
unable to find employment; that is, they become unemployed. While such individuals
usually receive compensation for their lost income, empirical data of psychological
scarring and permanent emotional harm due to unemployment even after such
individuals become reemployed implies that such individuals also should receive
additional compensation for their noneconomic losses. Likewise, if people do not find
a satiation point for money, it may be that monetary damage awards can have an
important impact on a victim's happiness.
2. Strength of Adaptation
There are further questions about rates and completeness of adaptation from injury.
Even for those disabilities and injuries to which individuals adapt, adaptation is only
important in the context ofnoneconomic damages if it is relatively quick and relatively
complete. Recent large-scale longitudinal studies, using nationally representative panel
data, call into question the strength of adaptation in domains where researchers had
already identified significant adaptation. These
longitudinal studies offer the promise
93
of a superior adaptation tracking method.

91. See Justin Wolfers, Op-Ed., The Economics of Happiness, Part 6: Delving into
Subjective Well-Being, Freakonomics, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Apr. 25, 2008, http://freakonomics.
blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/04/25/the-economics-of-happiness-part-6-delving-into-subjective-well-being/.
92. See generally Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the New Economics CanImprove
Employment DiscriminationLaw, and How Economics Can Survive the Demise of the
"RationalActor",51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 183 (2009) (developing implications of happiness

research about how courts should adjudicate in employment discrimination cases).
93. Lucas, supra note 62, at 719. In a cross-sectional study, researchers collect data at a
single point in time and compare control and experimental groups. For instance, researchers
compared the happiness levels of those with a specific injury (or those who had been divorced,
widowed, won the lottery, etc.) to people who had not experienced whatever event was the focus
of the study. In these studies, researchers did not know the participants' pre-event level of
subjective well-being. See id.As a result, the researchers could not compare pre-event happiness
to postevent happiness in the same population. Moreover, even where researchers tracked
population groups over time, the researchers for these studies often recruited "individuals
because they have experienced or are likely to experience the specific life event in question.
Thus, participants are usually aware of the purpose of the study and may over- or under[-]report
adaptation because of demand characteristics." Id. That is, participants may alter their answers
due to the nature of the studies themselves.
In contrast, in the recent longitudinal studies, researchers looked at the same panel of
individuals over time. Specifically, researchers looked at adaptation in longitudinal studies by
using large-scale national panel data from Germany and Great Britain. These surveys track large
numbers of individuals over multiple years and ask the same (or similar) set of questions each
year. Among other questions, respondents to these national surveys were asked to rank their
happiness on a numerical scale (one to ten in Great Britain and one to seven in Germany). Id.
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In two recent studies, social scientists used longitudinal data to determine whether
individuals adapt to disability. 94 In the first, Richard Lucas tracked 2272 British and
95
1679 German participants both before and after the onset of a long-term disability.
Using the German Socio-Economic Panel, Lucas tracked 675 respondents who had
been officially certified as "having a reduced capacity to work or being severely
96
handicapped" for an average of 7.18 years before injury and 7.39 years after injury.
With the British Household Panel Study, Lucas tracked 272 participants for an average
of 3.48 years before and 5.31 years after the onset of injury. 97 Not surprisingly,
participants in these studies reported moderate to large drops in life satisfaction and
corresponding increases in psychological distress post injury. More surprisingly,
although participants reported partial adaptation to the effects
of psychological
98
distress, the life satisfaction scores did not rebound over time.
In the second study, Andrew Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee provided only
modestly more support for hedonic adaptation to injury. Utilizing data from the British
Household Panel Survey, these scholars concluded that individuals who become
disabled go on to exhibit some degree of recovery in mental well-being, but found that
adaptation to severe disability is far from complete. 99 Oswald and Powdthavee found
that self-reported happiness for those with severe disability rebounded less than thirty
percent from their happiness nadirs.I00 Their findings for moderate disability are only
slightly more impressive-a self-report of fifty percent adaptation.10 1They concluded
that
[t]he data do not support the idea that after tragedy there is routinely a return to the
old well-being level: here in illustrative calculations we estimate the degree of
adaptation to be of the order of 30% to 50%. These results could be read alongside
the old, and highly-cited, cross-section work of Brickman et al. (1978), which has
come to be seen by many writers as claiming that human beings completely
recover psychologically from even extreme disability.'0 2
3. Importance of Adaptation
Lastly, apart from the lack of universality and strength of adaptation, it does not
seem that adaptation is that important in monetizing injuries.
Even when people report hedonic adaptation and a return toward preinjury levels of
happiness, they are still willing to sacrifice significant amounts of their life spans to
return their lost function. For instance, in one study, researchers asked colostomy
patients to imagine that they had ten years left to live and then asked the patients how

94. See id.; Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A
LongitudinalStudy ofDisabilitywith Implicationsfor Economists andJudges,92 J. PuB. ECON.
1061 (2008).
95. Lucas, supra note 62.
96. Id. at 719-20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 726.
99. Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 94.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1072.
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much of that time they would give up to live without a colostomy. On average, the
respondents reported that they would give up nineteen months of life to return to life
pre-colostomy. 10 3 In another study, dialysis patients reported a willingness to give up
over half of their remaining years to have normal kidney function.°4 These studies
indicate, first, that people strongly prefer to be healthy, even if their day-to-day level of
affect has returned to preinjury levels. Further, the studies reveal either that people care
about things other than happiness or that current happiness measures do not capture
something fundamental about well-being. A rebound in happiness or a decrease in
psychological distress does not mean that people have overcome their injuries, learned
to ignore their pain, or feel as healthy and complete as they did preinjury. Because
individuals care about things other than happiness, one's level of perceived happiness
may not be that important in monetizing injury.
These findings buttress the claim that happiness is a deep concept and that "there
are many things that matter to people in their lives independent of... their long-term
emotions."' 0 5 In addition to, or quite possibly even completely besides, the presence of
positive affect and the absence of negative affect, people want additional desiderata:
(1) capabilities; 10 6 (2) emotional and experiential variety, as captured in the famous
10 7
sentiment that it would be better to be a dissatisfied human being than a satisfied pig;
and (3) altruistic and moral experiences, such as taking care of one's kids, elderly
parents, or a bedridden spouse or close relative. 0 8 Individuals might also want
emotional responses beyond happiness to feel that they are living well. In particular,
people may care about: (1) meaning, as understood in at least one of these four
possible ways: resolving uncertain preferences, extending oneself either socially or
temporally, asserting one's free will, or constructing autobiographical narratives;' 0 9 and
(2) brief episodes of intense emotions, such as momentary spikes of sorrow and grief
over the loss of loved ones that can strike at any particular time.
These findings are not necessarily inconsistent with the earlier cross-sectional
studies. As Lucas noted, these findings "only contradict the standard interpretation of
this evidence."" 0 The early data showed that "individuals with disabilities are
moderately happy and do not have high rates ofpsychological disorders."" 1From this
information, researchers drew broad conclusions about hedonic adaptation. In light of

103. Dylan M. Smith, Ryan L. Sherriff, Laura Damschroder, George Loewenstein &Peter A.
Ubel, Misremembering Colostomies? Former Patients Give Lower Utility Ratings than Do
CurrentPatients,25 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 688, 691 (2006).

104. Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 56, at 1799.
105. Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 5, at S205.
106. MARTHA C.

NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND

HUMAN

DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES

(2000); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1999).
107. This was first captured by John Stuart Mill, see JOHN STUART MILL, UTLITARIANISM
(1863), and later endorsed by James Griffin, see JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING,
MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE (1989); SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 32
APPROACH

(1998);

JOSEPH RAZ, ETHIcs IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND

POLIncs (1994).
108. Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 5, at S207.
109. Niklas Karlsson, George Loewenstein & Jane McCafferty, The Economics ofMeaning,
30 NORDIC J. POL. ECON. 61 (2004).
110. Lucas, supra note 62, at 726.
111. Id.
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the longitudinal studies, one could conclude instead that even if people with disabilities
are relatively happy and free from psychological distress, they are not necessarily as
satisfiedwith their lives as they were before their injury.
4. Conclusions about Adaptation
In light of this evidence, a number of scholars have called for the hedonic set point
theory and the notion of a hedonic treadmill to be revised.1 2 Most importantly, one of
the fathers of the new science of happiness, 2002 economics Nobel Laureate Daniel
Kahneman, recently publicly changed his views about hedonic adaptation, stating, in
part:
The central question for students of well-being is the extent to which people adapt
to circumstances. Ten years ago, the generally accepted position was that there is
considerable hedonic adaptation to life conditions. The effects of circumstances on
life satisfaction appeared surprisingly small: The rich were only slightly more
satisfied with their lives than the poor, the married were happier than the
unmarried but not by much, and neither age nor moderately poor health
diminished life satisfaction. Evidence that people adapt--though not completelyto becoming paraplegic or winning the lottery supported the idea of a "hedonic
treadmill": we move but we remain in place. The famous Easterlin paradox seemed
to nail it down: Self-reported life satisfaction has changed very little in prosperous
countries over the last fifty years, in spite of large increases in the standard of
living....

Social scientists rarely change their minds, although they often adjust their
position to accommodate inconvenient facts. But it is rare for a hypothesis to be so
thoroughly falsified. Merely adjusting my position would not do; although I still
find the idea of an aspiration treadmill attractive, I had to give it up.
To compound the irony, recent findings from the Gallup World Poll raise doubts
about the puzzle itself. The most dramatic result is that when the entire range of
human living standards is considered, the effects of income on a measure of life
satisfaction (the "ladder of life") are not small at all. We had thought income
effects are small because we were looking within countries. The GDP differences
between countries are enormous and highly predictive of differences in life
satisfaction. In a sample of over 130,000 people from 126 countries, the
correlation between the life satisfaction of individuals and the GDP ofthe country
in which they live was over .40--an exceptionally high value in social science.
Humans everywhere, from Norway to Sierra Leone, apparently evaluate their life

112. See, e.g., Diener et al., supra note 80. Ed Diener and his coauthors proposed five
changes to the theory of the hedonic treadmill. First, an individual's set point is not hedonically
neutral. Second, individuals differ in their set points, partly based upon their temperaments.
Third, one individual can have several happiness set points, meaning that such different
components of subjective well-being as pleasant emotions, unpleasant emotions, and life
satisfaction can move in different directions. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, subjective
well-being set points can change under certain conditions. Fifth, individuals also differ in their
adaptation to events, so that some people change their hedonic set point and others do not
change their hedonic set point in response to a particular external event. Id.
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by a common standard of material prosperity, which changes as GDP increases.
The implied conclusion-that citizens of different countries do not adapt to their
level of prosperity-flies against everything we thought we knew ten years ago.
that there is a
We have been wrong and now we know it. I suppose this means
3
science of well-being, even if we are not doing it very well."
Nonetheless, as Lucas notes,' 1 4 there may be a way to reconcile this new longitudinal
data with older cross-sectional studies. But for our purposes here, it is simply important
to note that the story of adaptation is still being told and we do not know the strength or
the ubiquity of hedonic adaptation, if it exists at all. One conclusion to draw is that
5
happiness, life satisfaction, and well-being are quite complex. 1 More importantly,
these new data highlight that there is no clearly established theoretical consensus over
whether people adapt, why people adapt, at what rate they adapt, when they adapt, or
what increases or decreases rates of adaptation1n 6 All of which points to a more

113. Daniel Kahneman, What Constitutes Life Satisfaction?,in WHAT HAVE YOU CHANGED
YOUR MIND ABoUT?: TODAY'S LEADING MNDs RETHINK EVERYTHING 197, 199-200 (John
Brockman ed., 2009).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
115. Further complicating the notion of the hedonic treadmill are recent studies suggesting
that individuals can increase their happiness with seemingly minor events. "[W]hile major
events may not provide lasting increases in well-being, certain seemingly minor events-such as
attending religious services or exercising-may do so by providing small but frequent boosts: if
people engage in such behaviors with sufficient frequency, they may cumulatively experience
enough boosts to attain higher well-being." Daniel Mochon, Michael I. Norton & Dan Ariely,
Getting Off the Hedonic Treadmill, One Step at a Time: The Impact of Regular Religious
Practiceand Exercise on Well-Being, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 632, 632 (2008).
116. While there is not yet one canonical theoretical model ofhedonic adaptation, there are
several recent models which provide alternative theories of the processes underlying the general
phenomenon ofhedonic adaptation. A pair of economists developed an axiomatic mathematical
model of individual well-being incorporating cognitive factors. Itzhak Gilboa & David
Schmeidler, A Cognitive Model of Individual Well-Being, 18 Soc. CHOICE & INDIVIDUAL
WELFARE 269 (2001). They assumed that people compare their payoffs to aspiration levels
determined by adaptation, past experiences, interpersonal comparisons, others' performances,
and reasoning excuses and justifications. Another pair of economists view happiness to be a
biological measurement device and tool for decision making which helps people to rank
alternative choices. Luis Rayo & Gary S. Becker, EvolutionaryEfficiency andHappiness,115 J.
POL. EcoN 302 (2007). They mathematically demonstrated that hedonic adaptation is
evolutionarily advantageous, meaning that hedonic adaptation improves an individual's ability
to propagate her genes. A third pair of economists provided a related evolutionary theory of
hedonic adaptation and resilience. Liam Graham & Andrew J. Oswald, Hedonic Capital,
Adaptation, and Resilience, (Feb. 26, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.iza.org/
conference filesiBLE2008/oswalda262.pdf. Their model is based upon a new concept of
hedonic capital they defined to be the stock of psychological coping resources that an individual
has available. Finally, a pair of psychologists recently provided another theory of hedonic
adaptation they named the AREA model in which people Attend, React, Explain, and Adapt.
Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, ExplainingAway: A Model ofAffective Adaptation,3
PERSP. PSYCHOL. Sci. 370 (2008). In their model, hedonic adaptation results from a basic human
need to explain and make sense of external stimuli. These alternative models of why hedonic
adaptation occurs involve different processes and conceptual understandings about happiness.
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cautious approach in applying hedonic adaptation in legal domains. Further, it suggests
that it is too early to come to any definitive conclusions regarding the impact hedonic
adaptation has on awards for noneconomic damages.
C. Rethinking Affective Forecasting
If hedonic adaptation is less important than the legal hedonists claim, errors in
affective forecasting might still be a significant barrier to proper damage awards. In
other words, even if the many concerns that we raised above cast doubt on the strength,
ubiquity, or importance of hedonic adaptation, those concerns have no such impact on
the other surprising finding from happiness research, namely that people are poor
predictors of precisely how events will impact their happiness. That finding is still
robust; and, in fact, may better explain the meaning of some of the early cross-sectional
studies. We quickly review the literature on affective misforecasting. We conclude that
even if affective misforecasting presents a problem for jury deliberation (which is still
open for debate), there may be means, via introduction of evidence, to mitigate these
problems.
Studies have shown that individuals are poor predictors of how life events-like
winning the lottery or sustaining an injury-will change their overall life satisfaction
and future affective states. Although they might predict whether a particular event
would lead to a mix of positive or negative emotions, individuals will likely not predict
with any precision the specific mix of emotions they are going to feel ex ante,7
especially when events produce a combination of positive and negative emotions."l
More importantly, individuals do a particularly bad job predicting the intensity and
duration of any resulting emotional state.' 1 8 Not surprisingly, people are just as poor at
predicting how exogenous events will affect other people.' 1 9
There are a number of reasons for this misprediction. For example, when asked to
predict how an event will impact their happiness, individuals focus on the event to the
exclusion of the rest of one's life circumstances that may mitigate the impact of the
event. Further, individuals may not have familiarity with the event prompting the
emotional experience and thus may not be able to predict with any precision how it
would really impact someone's life. More importantly, individuals cannot properly
draw on past emotional experiences as a guide because they systematically
misremember emotional experiences,
which, ultimately, distorts their ability to predict
20
future emotional experiences.'
A prototypical example of this phenomenon is found in the 2000 election.' 21 George
W. Bush supporters overestimated how happy they had been when the U.S. 2000
Presidential election had been determined, and four months later, Al Gore supporters

117. See Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 9, at 348.
118. See Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 166-67; Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 9, at 347-51.
119. A large body of research documents people's tendencies to underestimate their own and
others' abilities to hedonically recover. See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 9; WILSON, supranote 9.
120. Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 174.
121. Timothy D. Wilson, Jay Meyers & Daniel T. Gilbert, "How Happy Was IAnyway? "A
Retrospective Impact Bias, 21 Soc. CoGNITIoN 421 (2003).
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overestimated how unhappy
they had been when the U.S. 2000 Presidential election
22
had been determined)
Even accepting these findings as true, there are several underappreciated aspects of
these results. First, while people's overestimation ofthe duration and intensity of affect
might seem undesirable from the point of accurately estimating affect, such
inaccuracies serve to effectively motivate people to undertake activities to avoid
negative affect and seek out positive affect. After all, inaccurate affective forecasts
motivate people to both avoid becoming tort victims and seek out damages from tort
litigation. In the jury context, researchers assume that because individuals inaccurately
forecast their own future affect, they will also be unable to accurately forecast someone
else's future affect, such as that of a plaintiff. But, if tort defendants and plaintiffs
believe that juries inaccurately forecast plaintiffs' affect just as plaintiffs do, then such
beliefs motivate potential defendants to not cause torts and plaintiffs to sue for
damages that in turn provide additional deterrence.
Second, although inaccuracies of affective forecasting can lead people to make
choices that fail to result in lasting happiness, 123 these inaccuracies underlie many
people's consumption and personal investment. In other words, much of Main Street
and Wall Street is fueled by people who mistakenly believe that increased consumer
expenditures and stock transactions lead to increased permanent happiness. 124 Indeed,
many advertising campaigns and marketing strategies encourage, foster, and reinforce
particular types of inaccurate affective forecasting. Although inaccurate affective
forecasting can be individually suboptimal in terms of experienced happiness,
inaccurate affective forecasting by individuals can be socially desirable in terms of
providing
financially desirable spillovers and creating happiness externalities for
25
others.

Third, many events to which people have a tendency to hedonically adapt
nonetheless can, and indeed will, produce long lasting if not permanent and often
irreversible outcomes which in turn produce further affective consequences. For
example, George W. Bush clearly made numerous policy decisions that Al Gore would
not likely have chosen. Many people believe that such choices have and will cause
negative results that are going to last for a long time if not a generation. Presidential
elections impact people's affect not only when those results are determined, but also
for the length of the President's tenure and possibly much longer. Voters care about
who is President because they realize that a President can make a difference for better
or worse in terms of many decisions including those about cabinet officials, domestic
programs, economic policies, executive orders, federal judicial appointments, foreign

122. Id.
123. Christopher K. Hsee & Reid Hastie, Decision and Experience: Why Don't We Choose
What Makes Us Happy?, 10 TRENDS COGNmTVE Sci. 31 (2006) (analyzing potentially surprising

findings that people systematically fail to predict or choose what maximizes their happiness);
Sharples, supra note 1 (reporting on related experimental research).

124. See generally LEE EISENBERG, SHOPTIMISM: WHY Ti AMERICAN CONSUMER WILL KEEP
No MATTER WHAT (2009).
125. Park, supra note 1, at 40-42 (reporting on research finding infectiousness of
happiness). See generally ELAINE HATFIELD, JOHN T. CAcIoppo & RIcHARD L. RAPSON,
EMOTIONAL CONTAGION (1994) (providing evidence that people tend to "catch" others'
ON BUYING

emotions).
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affairs, and national priorities. The happiness or unhappiness that supporters of
particular candidates feel upon learning the results of Presidential elections thus can
reflect not only their momentary affect but also their expected future total affect.
In contrast with the view that emotions are mere biases, legal scholar Dan Kahan
and psychologist Paul Slovic proposed that emotions can reflect cultural evaluations of
risk. 126 We share this viewpoint, which "implies that in order to protect risk regulation
from becoming culturally and morally impoverished, regulatory authority should not be
delegated solely to experts. 12 7 Similarly, we believe that in order to protect
adjudication from becoming culturally and morally impoverished, tort damages must
not be delegated solely to experts.
III. TORT DAMAGES
We can now return to the legal hedonists' claim that tort victims are
overcompensated because they adapt to their injuries and place those claims in the
wider debate about jury awards for noneconomic damages. Earlier scholars criticizing
indefinite awards-like noneconomic tort damages or punitive damages-have argued
that these awards are "too large, highly variable, and unpredictable";' 28 that jurors do
not consider social consequences of the awards; and that "jurors are biased against
wealthy defendants." 129 In other words, they claim that jurors cannot provide consistent
and logical noneconomic or punitive0awards, and thus, should not be allowed to grant
them without significant guidance.13
The legal hedonists' new claims dovetail with these earlier arguments. They claim
that, if tort victims adapt, damage awards for noneconomic damages like pain and
suffering, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life are meaningless and
speculative, because (1) the injury is fleeting or illusory and (2) juries cannot
adequately predict a plaintiff's true injury.
But this argument depends in large part on a narrow understanding ofnoneconomic
damages and how courts grant them. In this Part, we will address the definitional
disjunction between the legal hedonists and the courts.
The legal hedonists narrowly claim that courts grant noneconomic damages for
changes in affect (emotional changes) without regard to adaptation.' 3 ' But, there are

126. Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, CulturalEvaluationsofRisk: "Values" or "Blunders"?,
119 HARv.L. REv. 166 (2006).
127. Peter H. Huang, Response, Diverse Conceptions of Emotions in Risk Regulation, 156
U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 435, 436 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/032008/Huang.pdf.
128. GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 23.

129. Id. at 23, 24-26 (summarizing the arguments).
130. In response to these criticisms by scholars and practitioners, a number of states have
placed legislative caps on the amount that jurors can award for noneconomic damages. And, the
Supreme Court declared that there must be a logical relationship between the amount of
compensatory damages awarded and the amount of punitive damages awarded. See BMW ofN.
Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
131. For example, Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur clearly view noneconomic damages in
affective terms, claiming that the plaintiffs will adapt to "the losses for which these... types of
damages are meant to compensate." Bronsteen et al., supranote 5, at 1538 n. 115. Sunstein uses
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significant conceptual distinctions in the numerous types of noneconomic awards. 132
Not all of these awards are for changes in affective states, and none of these awards is
granted without at least some implicit understanding of adaptation.
As a precursor, recall that courts grant compensatory tort damages to restore an
injured party to his or her preinjury position. These awards should reflect both
economic losses, such as lost wages, loss of earning potential, and costs associated
with medical care and rehabilitation as well as noneconomic losses where there is no
obvious external, objective measure for the loss. Common law courts in this country
regularly award plaintiffs damages for physical pain; mental suffering, which arises
from awareness of the physical pain; mental distress-which encompasses negative
mental affect as a result of the injury, such as embarrassment; fright; worry; grief or
depression; loss of enjoyment of life; and loss of consortium, society, and
companionship.133 In this Part, we review the theoretical underpinnings and mechanics
of awards for several categories of noneconomic damages.
A. Pain,Suffering, and Mental Distress

There is a long history in Anglo-American law of compensation for pain and
suffering, 34 and courts have long distinguished "bodily pain" from "mental

the term "hedonic damages" to mean all noneconomic damages. Sunstein, supranote 5, at S160.
One suspects that Sunstein's motive is, in part, to paint these losses as connected solely to
emotions. Likewise, in discussing damages for loss of enjoyment of life, Bagenstos and
Schlanger focus solely on loss of"enjoyment" of life and diminished happiness, despite quoting
a more fulsome definition of the damage claim. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 5, at 748
(quoting Boan v. Blackwell, 541 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 2001)).
132. Even if these categories are treated as unitary for purposes of awarding damages, the
harm each category describes is distinct.
133. The American Law Institute divides noneconomic torts into four broad categories: (1)
tangible physiological pain at the time of the injury and during recuperation; (2) mental anguish
and suffering felt both before and after a physical injury; (3) emotional distress and long-term
loss of love and companionship from the injury or death of a close family member; and (4) loss
of enjoyment of life by victim of a tort. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTER'S STUDY,
ENTERPRISE RESPONsIB.rrY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 199-200 (1991).
134. The Western tradition of compensating an injured party for economic and noneconomic
losses traces its roots to Roman times. At least by 286 BC, Roman law compensated free men
and slaves for economic losses caused by negligence; and compensated free men for pain and
suffering when injuries were inflicted intentionally. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Theodore M.
Bailey, The History of Paymentfor Pain &Suffering, 1U. ILL. L. F. 83, 85 (1972). In Medieval
England, injurers made restitution to an injured party and the crown according to a schedule of
bots-asum the offender paid the injured party to buy back the peace-and wites-apenal fine
"paid to the king for breaking the peace... [and] to make amends for injuring another." Id. at
87 nn.38-39. These payments were made according to the severity of the injury. For instance,
the bot for exposure of bone was three shillings, loss of an ear was twelve shillings, and loss ofa
thumb was twenty shillings. See id. at 88. This system included payment for noneconomic
losses, like shame and injured feelings. See id. By the end of the twelfth century, tribunals
supplemented the bot system; and juries granted damages in addition to the scheduled bot
payment. Although noneconomic damages were not explicitly discussed, they were likely
included as a general element of damage awards. See id. at 90. As under the bot system,
individuals were compensated for slander and loss of honor. See id. at 90 n.57 (citing cases).
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anguish."' 135 Bodily pain is the physical pain felt as a result of an injury, and the
damage award compensates for the sensation of pain felt by the injured party at the
time of accident and during recuperation. Mental anguish (or suffering), in contrast,
refers to the emotional response to that pain; that is, the negative affect that results
from feeling pain, whether in the form of anxiety, anger, fear, hurt, etc.
Mental or emotional distress damages reflect negative emotions unrelated to
physical pain. This might occur, for instance, when an individual has been defamed or
witnessed the injury of a loved one (but has not been physically hurt themselves). In
some jurisdictions, emotional distress36also encompasses claims for loss ofconsortium,
companionship, love, and affection.
These awards may be for affective states, if not "purely hedonic" in nature.' But
there is no evidence that juries are instructed to, or actually do, evaluate these damage
awards without implicitly or explicitly considering adaptation. To the contrary, when
considering pain and suffering, juries are instructed that they may award damages that
will reasonably compensate "for any past physical pain, as well as pain that is
reasonably certain to be suffered in the future"' 138 and in doing so "should consider all
the evidence bearing on the nature of the injuries, the certainty of future pain, the
severity and likely duration thereof."' 39 In considering "past pain" or the "severity"
and "duration" of the pain, juries must consider the variable and temporal notion of
pain. Thus, juries necessarily consider whether plaintiffs' pain, suffering, and distress
have dissipated or persist; and, if the latter, at what level the injury persists. This is an
explicit nod to adaptation.

135. Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, 235 (1842). Although English courts of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seemed to decry awarding noneconomic damages, they
regularly awarded damages that could not be justified by strict economic loss. See, e.g., Ash v.
Lady Ash, 90 Eng. Rep. 526 (K.B. 1696). But at least by 1773, English courts explicitly allowed
noneconomic damages where a plaintiff experienced "great and excruciating pain and torture."
Scott v. Shepperd, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124, 1125 (K.B. 1773). And by 1798, following the award in
Scott v. Shepperd, pleading books included claims for "excruciating pains and tortures both of
body and mind." O'Connell & Bailey, supra note 134, at 92 (citing 8 J.WENTWORTH, A
COMPLETE SYSTEM OF PLEADING 437 (1798); J. CImTIrY, A TREATISE ON PLEADING (1809)). By

the 1820s and 30s, courts in this country regularly allowed juries to grant damages for pain and
suffering. See id. at 93. For instance, in rejecting a challenge to a tort verdict as allegedly
excessive, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: "the plaintiff was exposed to the imminent
peril of his life, to great bodily and mental suffering.., we cannot say that the sum assessed by
the jury exceeds a reasonable compensation." Worster v. Proprietors of the Canal Bridge, 33

Mass. (16 Pick.) 541, 547 (1835).
136. Today injured parties can universally recover for pain and mental suffering that results
from physical injuries; however a party's ability to recover for mental distress varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See generally JEROME H. NATES, CLARK D. KIMBALL, DIANA T.
AXELROD, RICHARD P. GOLDSTEIN &ROBERT L. CONASON, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTONs § 4.01[2]

(2007).
137. That is, these awards are granted for changes in emotional states, but are not necessarily
tied directly to some notion of happiness.
138. RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT DAMAGES § 6-21 (4th ed.
1998) (emphasis added).
139. Id (emphasis added).
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Likewise, where juries consider noneconomic damages as a unitary award, juries are
instructed to "compensate . . . for any bodily injury and any resulting pain and
suffering, ... (mental anguish), (and), (loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life)
experienced in the past (and which you find from the evidence that he is reasonably
certain to suffer in the future from the injury in question)."' 140 Again, there is a
temporal nature to the instruction. Juries are asked to consider pain the plaintiff
"experienced in the past"'14 1 and is "certain to suffer in the future."' 1 42 This language
implies that noneconomic losses are neither fixed nor permanent. Thus, even to the
extent that juries compensate for pain and suffering or mental distress in affective
terms, they likely take into account the fact that physiological pain often fades.
We do not read the legal hedonists to argue that awards for noneconomic damages
are inappropriate per se. They simply argue that either juries ought to consider
adaptation or are incapable of doing so (or both). As to the first argument, it is clear
that parties will ask jurors to consider both the affective change and the likely
adaptation. One can expect that plaintiffs will put evidence into the record to
demonstrate their physical and mental pain. In response, defendants can and will most
likely introduce evidence to show that plaintiffs are no longer in the physical or mental
pain that they were immediately after the injury. As to the second, even ifjurors have
trouble anticipating the plaintiff's adaptation, and thus make affective forecasting
mistakes, these mistakes may not be a problem for the tort system. As we discuss, it is
not clear that awards should be calibrated to postadaptation injuries
or that courts are
43
overcompensating when they fail to account for adaptation. 1
B. Loss of Enjoyment of Life
It is to the other major category of noneconomic damages-loss of enjoyment of
life-that Sunstein and Bagenstos and Schlanger address their main arguments.'44 As
noted above, the legal hedonists suggest that hedonic damages are inappropriate
because they compensate for a loss of happiness. This argument misconstrues the
nature of awards for hedonic loss. While courts today use the term "hedonic damages"
interchangeably with the term "loss of enjoyment of life,' ' 145 that does not mean that
these damages are necessarily to be understood in affective or purely hedonic terms.

140.

EDWARD J. DEvIrr, CHARLES B. BLACKMAR & MICHAEL A. WOLFF, 3A FEDERAL JURY

PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, CIV.

§ 85.02 (1987) (emphasis added).

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See infra Part IV.
144. Ubel and Loewenstein, of course, focus more explicitly on pain and suffering, but
include a footnote related to damages for loss of enjoyment of life. Ubel & Loewenstein, supra
note 5, at S197 n.1.
145. See Foster v. Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 285 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
("The term 'hedonic damages' ... is new to our jurisprudence, the concept is not."); Victor E.
Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling Cauldron,69 BROOK. L.
REv. 1037, 1040 (2004) ("Prior to the mid- to late- 1980s, courts did not refer to hedonic
damages, but instead awarded damages for 'loss of enjoyment of life."').

2010]

TORT DAMAGES AND THE NEW SCIENCE OFHAPPINESS

581

As history and common usage shows, courts use the term "hedonic
damages" to refer
46
to awards for a loss of capabilities, not a loss of happiness.1
The history of damages for loss ofenjoyment of life traces back to the middle of the
nineteenth century. Although nineteenth-century American courts regularly allowed
damages for pain, suffering, and mental distress, courts tended to reject damages for
loss of enjoyment of life as being too speculative. For example, in Columbus v.
Strassner,147 the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury that it could take account of any "loss of 'personal enjoyment"'
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's conduct. 48 The court reasoned
that ajury could not define "personal enjoyment," let alone assess a monetary value to
a lack of such enjoyment.149 The court therefore stated that there would be an
insuperable difficulty
to the measurement of damages because of loss of "personal
150
enjoyment.'
Similarly, in Belleview v. England,'51 a Kentucky appellate court held, in a slip and
fall case, that the trial court erred in giving an instruction that the jury "might
compensate the plaintiff for any diminution of his power to pursue the course of life he
might otherwise have done."' 52 The court held that such an instruction would lead the
jury "into a field
of speculation too indefinite to afford the basis of legal
53
compensation."'

Many courts nonetheless rejected these early concerns, reasoning that awarding
damages for loss of enjoyment of life provided complete compensation for injured
parties. For instance, despite the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Columbus v.
Strassner,Indiana appellate courts at the turn of the twentieth century allowed juries to
consider the fact that the plaintiff was "deprived of the pleasure and satisfaction in life
that those only can
enjoy who are possessed of a sound body, and of the free use of all
' 54
of its members."'

By the 1930s, a number of courts allowed damages under the category of loss 155
of
enjoyment of life for loss of capabilities. For example, in Budek v. City of Chicago,
the court affirmed a damage award of $50,000 for a woman injured in a car accident.
In justifying the award, the court noted that the plaintiff was unable to "give normal

146. In the majority ofjurisdictions, courts may instruct ajury that they can award damages
for loss of enjoyment of life. The dividing issue is whether these damages are part of pain and
suffering or can be awarded as a separate category of damages.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

25 N.E. 65 (Ind. 1890).
Id. at 67.
See id.
Id.
18 SW. 944 (Ky. 1909).
Id.at 995.
Id.

154. Am. Strawboard Co. v. Foust, 39 N.E. 891, 894 (Ind. App. 1895), overruledby South
Bend Brick Co. v. Goller, 93 N.E. 37 (Ind. App. 1910); accordPittsburgh, C., C. & St. Louis
R.R. Co. v. Cozatt, 79 N.E. 534, 539 (Ind.App. 1906) overruledby South Bend Brick Co., 93
N.E. 37. Although these opinions were expressly overruled in South Bend Brick Company v.
Goller, 93 N.E. at 40, they were the harbinger of courts commonly instructing juries on loss of
enjoyment of life.
155. 279 Ill. App. 410 (App. Ct. 1935).
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birth to a child"'15 6 and57she was "deprived of the privileges and enjoyments common to
people of her class."1
In Daughertyv. Erie RailroadCo., 158 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a
holding that the jury verdict in favor of a plaintiff was inadequate as a matter of law.
The court reasoned that the jury had failed to recompense the plaintiff for his
permanent disfigurement and his loss of taste and smell. With regard to the plaintiff's
appearance, the court stated, "[t]o destroy that good appearance is to destroy one of the
greatest treasures a person may possess."' 159 The court was even more effusive when it
described a loss from an inability to smell or taste:
One does not need to be a gourmand or gourmet to conclude that the consumption
of food and drink represents a not inconsiderable portion of man's enjoyment of
life. To be deprived of the capacity to enjoy flavorful dishes and palatable
160
beverages is to be robbed of much of what goes into a rewarding existence ....

Even if this award contains an element of affective consideration, the underlying award
is for loss of capabilities.
Likewise today, despite calling these damages "hedonic damages," courts still
compensate for loss of capabilities. For instance, the Third Circuit stated: "[t]he
component relating to loss of enjoyment of life in some respects duplicates the
component of pain and suffering, but also represents a deprivation of the opportunity to
participate in normal social, athletic, or recreational activities in which a person
without [plaintiff's] injury could engage."'' l Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held that in
evaluating damages for loss of enjoyment of life, juries could consider whether the
injury impaired the plaintiffs ability to enjoy 'the occupation of [his] choice,'
'activities of daily living,' 'social leisure activities[,]' and 'internal well-being.," 62 In
this regard, damages for loss of enjoyment of life have been awarded for loss of one of
164
the five basic senses; 163 an inability to continue to work in one's work or avocation;
interference with daily and family recreational activities;' 65 and interference with

156. Id. at 429.
157. Id.
158. 169 A.2d 549, 550 (Pa. 1961).
159. Id.at 552.
160. Id.
161. Gumbs v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 774 (3d Cir. 1987).
162. Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying New
Mexico law).
163. See, e.g., Yako v. United States, 891 F.2d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 1989) (loss of hearing);
Early v. United States, 474 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1973) (loss of taste and smell); Dyer v.
United States, 551 F. Supp. 1266, 1281 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (loss of taste); Carter v. Phillips,
365 So. 2d 48, 50 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (loss of touch); Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d
574, 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (loss of sight).
164. See, e.g., Winter v. Pa. R.R., 68 A.2d 513, 514 (Del. 1949) (compensating a musician
because of an inability to play privately and publicly even without pay); Fleischmann v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 216, 218 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (compensating for inability to enter
profession for which plaintiff had trained).
165. See, e.g., Vamell v. La. Tech. Univ., 709 So. 2d 890, 896 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
(compensating for plaintiff's inability to engage in outdoor activities, participate in school
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childbearing.166 "The range of activities upon which recovery has been based...
[includes] gardening; sewing; playing with one's children; woodworking; dancing;
caring for an invalid spouse; walking or hiking for any considerable distance or time;
engaging in 'normal family activities,' including family picnics and shopping; and
working for one's community or church."'' 67 Thus, these are not awards for purely
hedonic losses.
Although courts use the terms "hedonic damages"1 68 and "loss of enjoyment of life,"
which suggest affective components, the monikers are misleading. Courts grant loss of
enjoyment of life damages not for hedonic or affective changes but for loss of
capabilities.
C. DefinitionalDisjunctions
In sum, the legal hedonists claim that the jury awards for pain, suffering, mental
distress, and loss of enjoyment of life are generally understood as damages for changes
in affective states without regard to adaptation. This understanding, however,
misinterprets the law. Damages for loss of enjoyment of life are, in fact, damages for
lost capabilities or lost opportunities-a category of damages that these scholars
support. Moreover, while damages for pain and suffering seem to be for changes in
affective states, juries may consider past and future damages. Thus juries likely
consider relevant postinjury adjustments in plaintiffs' affective states.
IV. HAPPiNEss AND JuRIEs

Given our skepticism about the nature and power of hedonic adaptation, it is no
surprise that we do not find it as a significant barrier to jury awards for noneconomic
damages. We previously concluded that the legal hedonists overstate the power,
ubiquity, and importance of adaptation and understate the way the tort system
functions, play with her youngest child, or engage in sexual activities with her husband).
166. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 935,971 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (awarding
damages for diminishment of capacity to conceive).
167. NATESETAL.,supra note 136, §8.04[5].

168. The term hedonic damages first appeared in 1985. See Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp.
159, 163 (N.D. Ill.
1985). In a wrongful death lawsuit, the victim's father called Stanley Smith,
a University of Chicago-trained economist, to testify about the damages suffered as a result of
the death of the son. Id. at 162. In his expert report and his trial testimony, Smith did not opine
on the economic loss that resulted from the son's death, but rather, what he called "the hedonic
value of life, separate from economic productive value of an individual." Id. In defining the term
"hedonic" as used in the phrase "hedonic value of life," Smith testified:
It derives from the word pleasing or pleasure. I believe it is a Greek word.
It is distinct from the word economic. So it refers to the larger value of
life, the life at the pleasure of society, if you will, the life-the value
including economic, including moral, including philosophical, including
all the value with which you might hold life, is the meaning of the
expression "hedonic value."
Id. at 163. The trial court allowed this testimony over defendants' objection, reasoning first that
the deceased's estate could sue for the loss of life and second that "the loss of life means more
than being deprived of the right to exist, or of the ability to earn a living; it includes deprivation
of the pleasures of life." Id. (emphasis added).

INDIANA LA WJOURNVAL

[Vol. 85:553

compensates injured parties. In this Part, we first tie together the reasons why theories
about hedonic adaptation do not justify a complete or partial dismantling of the jury
award system for noneconomic damages. We then consider how well juries evaluate
noneconomic damages even in light of affective forecasting errors. We finally turn to a
brief examination of some other issues related to jury awards.
A. Hedonic Adaptation andNoneconomic Damages
As we discussed in detail above, scholars have suggested that hedonic adaptation
undermines the theoretical underpinnings of noneconomic damages and concomitant
jury awards for those damages. In short, these scholars argue that (1) noneconomic
damage awards are granted for changes in affect, (2) changes in affect are fleeting,
because people adapt, and thus (3) noneconomic injuries are illusory and the damage
awards unfounded. We have a number of responses to these arguments. First, it is not
clear that happiness is relevant to monetizing noneconomic injuries. Second,
adaptation may not be strong enough or ubiquitous enough to impact all noneconomic
injuries. Third, even if happiness is relevant to monetizing noneconomic injuries and
adaptation is strong and ubiquitous enough to impact tort victims, it is not clear that we
should prioritize a plaintiff's postadaptation feeling of loss over her preadaptation
feeling of loss. Fourth, and related, privileging ex post feelings over ex ante feelings is
a normative judgment. Lastly, the system does not simply compensate for changes in
affect. Rather, the system provides damages for lost capabilities, lost options, and
changes in affect with an eye to adaptation.
First, and most importantly, it is possible that the data collected on happiness says
little about how to monetize noneconomic injuries. Even questions designed to elicit
rankings of subjective well-being and life satisfaction, as opposed to measuring mere
affect, may be missing the most fundamental parts of the human existence. The
questions may not accurately measure whether people feel meaning or fulfillment,
experiential and emotional variety, or a sense of achievement despite negative affect.
Indeed, if, as Ubel and Loewenstein reported, injured people are willing to give up
significant portions of their remaining years to live without injury,'69 happiness may
not be that important a factor to those living with injury. Or, at a minimum, those who
are living with injury care about far more than happiness and life-satisfaction.
Moreover, there can be no real claim that injuries are not causing noneconomic losses
or that those noneconomic losses are somehow illusory.
Second, even to the extent that one believes that the happiness data is important to
the process of monetizing injury, hedonic adaptation is not nearly as ubiquitous or
strong as once believed, and it is certainly not powerful enough to justify the
conclusion that noneconomic awards are illusory. As we discussed,170 there are
significant data suggesting that individuals do not adapt to a number of life
circumstances. People do not adapt to diseases or illnesses that get progressively worse
or where there is a hope of recovery. Moreover, in noninjury domains people do not
adapt to divorce, unemployment, or loss of a loved one. Thus, when someone's injury
gets progressively worse or when an injury leads to unemployment or death of a loved

169. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
170. See supra Part ll.B.
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one, her happiness will not necessarily return to preevent levels. Moreover, recent
studies have undermined the earlier belief in the strength of adaptation. Recent
longitudinal studies suggest that even where there is evidence of adaptation to injury,
individual happiness and life satisfaction may only make modest returns. 7' That is,
even if people who suffer moderate or significant injuries feel less distress over time,
they do not necessarily feel happier or more satisfied with their life. As such, hedonic
adaptation may not be as strong as once thought. If hedonic adaptation is not strong or
ubiquitous, it may not have a role in monetizing injury.
Third, in arguing that noneconomic losses based on affect are illusory, the legal
hedonists claim that one should judge injury postadaptation. But it is unclear why our
72
legal system should normatively consider losses to which people adapt as illusory.'
To the contrary, to force optimal investment in precaution and to compensate fully, we
must consider the preadaptation injury. Suppose that, immediately after an injury, a
plaintiff's pain and suffering are valued at one million dollars. Suppose also that,
preinjury, the plaintiff enjoyed skiing and writing, but can do neither after the injury.
This loss of enjoyment of life may also be valued at one million dollars. Thus,
immediately after the injury, the plaintiff had noneconomic losses of two million
dollars. If, over time, the plaintiff adapts to her pain and her suffering dissipates to
nothing, one who believes that damages should be valued postadaptation might argue
she is entitled only to one million dollars in noneconomic damages. And, more starkly,
one who believes that happiness is the only way to judge noneconomic losses would
argue that she is entitled to nothing. But this argument would take the actual
experienced pain and suffering (and possibly a calculation of lost capabilities)
completely out of the equation, and would therefore undercompensate the plaintiff.
Moreover, this theory would not properly incentivize potential tortfeasors to take
proper precaution, because a defendant would not have to completely internalize the
negative externality created by the pain and suffering their actions proximately caused.
Said more formally, from a happiness perspective, ajury should award an amount in
monetary damages equal to the area under the curve that represents instantaneous
happiness on the vertical axis and time on the horizontal axis from the moment of
injury until whenever there is complete hedonic recovery from the injury. 173 In other
words, the amount of monetary award should be the integral of the instantaneous
happiness function over time from the moment of injury until there is complete hedonic
adaptation if and when that occurs. Only by awarding this amount can the legal system

171. Lucas, supranote 62, at 726; see supra Part II.B.2.
172. If one were to take seriously the argument that injury should be judged postadaptation,
then this argument suggests three corollaries. First, tortfeasors will have to introduce testimony
about a victim's preinjury baseline happiness, against which her postinjury happiness can be
judged. Second, injured parties should have a duty to mitigate their losses by taking all possible
steps to improve the rate or completeness of adaptation. Third, we should consider having
tortfeasors provide more than monetary compensation to victims of torts. Tortfeasors could
provide or subsidize activities that foster adaptation, such as courses about new skills or hobbies
(unrelated to work), meditation, therapeutic counseling, or vocational retraining. But these
corollaries are thus far unexplored by the legal hedonists.
173. This time series will include any lingering memories of pain or mental anguish. That is,
adaptation is not complete as long as tort victims still suffer negatively from memories of the
pain and suffering.
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and society ensure that potential defendants will take proper precautions and that
injured plaintiffs will be properly compensated.
Fourth, legal hedonists privilege an individual's ex post experienced happiness over
that same person's ex ante decision utility.17 4 That is, the legal hedonists assume that if
and when a plaintiff's experienced happiness has returned to preinjury levels, she
should not be compensated for that injury.1 75 They assert that this assumption is true,
even if, after the plaintiff's happiness returns, she prefers to live without injury or still
prefers to be compensated for her injuries. 176 But, as we discussed earlier, a plaintiff's
true well-being is not equal to just her experienced happiness. Simply measuring one's
happiness as a proxy for well-being misses important aspects of one's well-being. For
example, people may choose activities that will actually reduce their experienced
happiness. Such decisions can provide meaning, increase the variance and intensity of
emotions, fulfill unfulfilled altruistic motivations, or allow for exercise of fundamental
capabilities. We are not suggesting that a plaintiff's decision to litigate is entirely
reflective of her well-being either. But we believe that an individual's true well-being
is not just limited to experienced affect.
Another way to appreciate how legal hedonists privilege a particular time slice of
life is to view emotions over a timeline ranging from before a decision is made to after
one is made. People feel anticipatory emotions, such as anxiety and exuberance, before
making decisions. People also forecast how they will feel if they make certain
decisions. These affective forecasts are called anticipated emotions, also referred to as
decision utility. 177 Once people make decisions but even before those decisions'
outcomes are realized, people feel interim emotions, such as dread or savoring. People
also still have their decision or predicted utility forecasts. The moment outcomes of
decisions materialize, people feel experienced affect (also referred to as experienced
utility), 178 such as disappointment or relief Finally, after outcomes of decisions

materialize, people feel ex post emotions and experience remembered utility.
The central point of the above timeline is that emotions vary over the course of the
decision-making process. In particular, psychological research studies find that
predicted and remembered emotions have a tendency to coincide and both differ from
experienced emotions. 179 Such temporal differences in emotions mean that people

174. Neoclassical economics views a person's decision utility as information that can be
inferred from or revealed by that person's choices if that person's behavior satisfies certain
assumptions, notably the so-called weak axiom of revealed preference. Paul A. Samuelson, A
Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA 61, 62-71 (1938)
(introducing the weak axiom of revealed preference).
175. For Bagenstos and Schlanger, this argument is grounded in a belief that compensation
for disability causes its own dignitary harm, not purely in a notion that the losses themselves are
illusory. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra, note 5.
176. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
177. See Barbara A. Mellers & A. Peter McGraw, Anticipated Emotions as Guides to
Choice, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. ScI. 210 (2001); Dylan M. Smith, Stephanie L.
Brown & Peter A. Ubel, Are Subjective Well-Being MeasuresAny Better Than Decision Utility
Measures?, 3 HEALTH ECON., POL'Y & L. 85 (2008).
178. Daniel Kahneman & Richard Thaler, Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility, J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2006, at 221.
179. See, e.g., Terence R. Mitchell, Leigh Thompson, Erika Peterson & Randy Cronk,
TemporalAdjustments in the EvaluationofEvents: The "Rosy" View, 33 J. EXPEuMENTAL SOC.

2010]

TORT DAMAGES AND THE NEW SCIENCE OF HAPPINESS

587

themselves as well as law and policy makers have to balance or choose among the
well-being of predicting selves, experiencing selves, and remembering selves. The
legal hedonists favor people's experiencing selves over their predicting selves and
remembering selves. We believe that just as cogent a case can be made in favor of
people's predicting selves or their remembering selves.
Lastly, and related, some legal hedonists argue that noneconomic damages should
be aimed at compensating for lost capabilities rather than solely for changes in
affective states. In other words, they argue that even if people who have suffered
injuries were to experience complete hedonic adaptation, they nonetheless have lost an
option to engage in certain activities, and this loss should be compensated. As we
discussed, the law already aims to compensate for lost capabilities, experiential and
emotional variety, and for lost opportunity in the form of damages for loss of
enjoyment of life. But leave that aside for a moment. Importantly, the legal hedonists
may not have properly considered the importance of emotional variance in the pricing
of lost capabilities or options. Capability damages can be understood as compensating
1 80
a tort victim for losing the flexibility or freedom to engage in certain activities.
One way to understand capabilities is to think of them as real options-that is,
rights, but not obligations-to make decisions, such as options to abandon, delay,
expand, or undertake capital investments (like constructing new factory plants or
drilling for oil).' Unlike financial options, real options usually are not and cannot be
traded. Nonetheless, empirical techniques and theoretical insights about financial
option valuation can be applied to valuation of real options)18 2 Under certain
hypotheses, the value of a financial option increases with the volatility of the price of

PSYCHOL. 421, 422-27 (1997); Robert I. Sutton, Feelings about a Disneyland Visit:
Photographyand the Reconstruction of Bygone Emotions, 1 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 278, 280-81
(1992); Leaf Van Boven & Laurence Ashworth, Looking Forward,Looking Back: Anticipation
is More Evocative than Retrospection, 136 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 289, 289-91
(2007).
180. Such a perspective is related to 1972 economics Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow's
proposal about one way to incorporate freedom into a formal economic theory of choice.
Kenneth J. Arrow, A Note on FreedomandFlexibility, in CHOICE, WELFARE, AND DEVELOPMENT
7 (Kaushik Basu, P. Pattanaik & K. Suzumura, eds., 1995). Arrow's notion of people being free
to enjoy preference flexibility is motivated by and similar to "the concept of flexibility, where
there is a sequence of decisions in the face of uncertainties." Kenneth J. Arrow, Freedom and
Social Choice: Notes in the Margin, 18 UTiLITAs 52, 57 n. 18 (2006).
181. See, e.g., MARTHA AMRAM & NALrN KULATLAKA, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGING
STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 3-6 (1999); JONATHAN MuN, REAL OPTIONS
ANALYSIS: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR VALUING STRATEGIC INVESTMENT AND DECISIONS 45968 (2d ed. 2005). "Real options" are so named as to differentiate them from "financial options,"
which are defined to be rights, but not obligations, to either buy or sell a particular underlying
financial asset. Familiar examples of financial options are stock options that many corporations
provide their executives, directors, and officers as part of their incentive compensation
packages.
182. Scholars have applied real options analysis to value lawsuits. See, e.g., Joseph A.
Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value ofLitigation:A Real Options Perspective,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270 (2006); Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk
MultipliersofAttorneys 'Fees in FederalCivil Rights Litigation,73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1943, 1946
(1998); Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation
Games, 23 REv. LITIG. 47,49-50 (2004).
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the underlying asset of that option. 8 3 An analogous result in real options theory is that
the value of a real option increases with the volatility of the value of the decision that is
associated with that real option. Applying this result to capability damagesunderstood as compensating for the loss of real-option values to engage in activities
that generate a range of feelings-implies that capability damages should increase with
the variance of emotions that result from such activities.184 In other words, from a realoptions perspective, being unable to engage in activities that involve a wide range of
emotions should result in higher damages than being unable to engage in activities that
involve a narrow range of emotions. So if parenting involves a high variance of
emotions,18 5 then being unable to be a parent should entail high real-options damages.
Similarly, there should be high real-options damages for the example that Ubel and
Loewenstein provide of "a person who suffers brain damage from
an industrial
' 86
accident and is turned into a happy simpleton because of the injury."
B. JuryAwards and Noneconomic Damages
But even if hedonic adaptation is not a reason to undermine tort damage awards, the
legal hedonists may argue that affective forecasting errors demonstrate the unreliability
ofjury awards.
A central question tort lawsuits must answer is whether juries are awarding the
correct amount for noneconomic damages. This question, of course, just begs the basic
question what we mean by the "correct amount." The answer, from a purely law and
economics perspective, is to choose a level of damages that balances deterrence of
tortfeasors and compensation of tort victims. 87 Tort compensation may also serve an
expressive or symbolic function, demonstrating that harming others is a wrongful act
that causes dignitary harm beyond the physical and emotional damages.
In selecting the level of damages, courts do not and should not consider only
happiness. Rather, courts can and should award tort victims compensatory damages for
any or all five of these conceptually and theoretically distinct but often practically and
realistically intertwined harms: (1) pain and suffering, (2) lost capabilities, (3)
emotional distress, (4) decreased life satisfaction, and (5) the "sweat and tears" victims
expend in recovering from injuries. This last component of compensatory tort damages
can be analogized to damages in antitrust litigation-including a component for
expenditures that plaintiffs had to make in response to defendant's wrongful conduct.
We have in mind various emotional, mental, and physical anguishes, as well as efforts
and labor that plaintiffs incur during their recovery activities. This compensation is
distinct from and should be contrasted with such out-of-pocket expenses as money
spent on crutches, drugs, physical-rehabilitation therapy, or wheelchairs, for which

183. Robert C. Merton, Theory of RationalOption Pricing,4 BELL J. ECON. &MGMT. SCi.
141,149 (1973).
184. Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 56, at 1802.
185. Id.
186. Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 5, at S206.
187. This answer in turn only begs other questions, such as whether such compensation
should include how court procedures affect peoples happiness. Jose Mulder, How Do We
Compensate A Victim's Loss? An Economic Perspective,(Tilburg Law and Economics Center

Discussion Paper No. 2008-12 Mar. 2008).
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plaintiffs can and should also be compensated for under the category of economic
damages.
A possible way to assist juries in determining compensatory damages is to utilize
novel empirical research about how people spend time and how they feel during
various activities. 8 8 This research involves two alternative types of survey data based
primarily upon the new Princeton Affect and Time Survey, that is a diary-based
national survey measure of time use and affective experience. 8 9 The first entails selfreports of these six affective experiences: feeling interested, stressed, happy, sad, pain,
and tired. 190 The second is the U-index,' 9' which measures the percentage of time spent
in an unpleasant state,
which in turn is defined as an episode in which the strongest
192
emotion is negative.
Both types of data can help juries normatively evaluate how tort victims change
how they spend their time before and after a tort. The key point is, regardless of the
degree that happiness can adapt following an injury, tort victims are going to allocate
their scarce time differently postinjury compared to preinjury. Tort victims are going to
be unable to engage in some activities postinjury and have to engage in some other
activities postinjury because of the injury. Reallocations of time and changes in
activities imply different quantities and types of experienced affect. These resulting
affective changes provide data that can inform jury deliberations about compensatory
damages. Of course, juries have to convert such changes in experienced affect into
dollars. Although that conversion can certainly be a daunting undertaking, it can
benefit from
expert testimony based upon econometric analysis of happiness regression
193
equations.
We believe that jurors are better suited to determine and evaluate compensatory
damages for individual plaintiffs' 94 than technocratic experts will be at developing a set
of civil damages guidelines; 195 a random panel of citizens will be at developing and
ranking a list of representative injuries grouped into categories of compensation; 196 or
federal or state legislators would be in setting maximum damage amounts.' 97
Obviously, jurors face a difficult task in monetizing pain, suffering, or loss of
enjoyment of life. 198 But trial by jury provides a unique opportunity to individuate
damages. As two preeminent empirical jury scholars Neil Vidmar and Valerie Hans
observed:

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See Krueger, More Fun, supra note 25, at 194-95.
Id., at 194.
Id.
Kahneman & Krueger, Developments, supra note 25, at 19.
Id.
See, e.g., Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 87.
Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 5, at S212.
Sunstein, supra note 5, at S 184-86.
Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 5, at S208-09.
Id. atS210-11.

198. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANs, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 284 (2007) ("There

is no way to place an exact figure on what such injuries are worth. The jury has to consider the
individual circumstances and local community norms. At trial, plaintiffs or spouses testify about
what the injury has done to their lives, providing the jury with insight about the consequences of
the injury.").
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The jury is in a position to decide, as well as anyone, the special circumstances of
pain suffered by the plaintiff. Consider people who have lost a leg due to
negligence. Sometimes amputees experience excruciating "phantom pain" that is
unabating, and doctors can do little but prescribe heavy doses of pain medicine. In
contrast, a second person with an identical amputation injury will experience no
pain; a third person will have intermittent pain. Similar differences occur with
whiplash injuries. Some people have stronger tolerance for pain or mental anguish,
but others have weaker tolerance. The jury is asked to consider the special
circumstances of the plaintiff.'9
Moreover, excerpts of real jury deliberations from the Arizona Jury Project-a
research initiative to analyze implications of several jury reforms-reveal that jurors
individually and collectively200 "[take] their task20very
seriously, often to the extent of
1
calculating and arguing down to the last dollar."
Despite the advantages of individuation, the legal hedonists could argue that juries
may neither comprehend nor listen to jury instructions that judges provide; the legal
system does not monitor juries to ensure that juries actually follow instructions; and
that, as a result of errors in affective forecasting, individual jury members will make
systematic errors in awarding noneconomic damages, even if they understand the
instructions. But juries deliberate and it remains an open empirical question whether
jury deliberation mitigates, exacerbates, or does not change individual jury member's
affective forecasts.
202
It is true that jury instructions on noneconomic damages are notoriously vague
and are thus likely too complex to follow or provide adequate direction to jurors.2

3

199. Id. at 295.
200. A unique aspect ofjury awards is that they result from a deliberative process. As Vidmar
and Hans observed:
A representative, diverse jury promotes vigorous debate. One of the most dramatic
and important changes over the last half century is the increasing diversity of the
American jury. Diverse juries have an edge in fact-finding, especially when the
matters at issue incorporate social norms and judgments, as jury trials often do.
Deliberation improves comprehension. Jurors with expertise on a topic often take
a lead role when the jury discusses that topic, and errors made by one juror are
frequently corrected by another juror. Deliberations encourage the sharing of
knowledge and also the testing of narrative accounts. The representative jury and
its verdicts are also seen as more legitimate by the public, an important strength of
the jury as an institution.
Id. at 340.
201. Id.at 299.
202. Vidmar and Hans observe:
Instructions on pain and suffering implicitly acknowledge the vagueness of the
jury's task. For instance, a North Carolina jury instruction says: "Damages should
include such amount as you find, by the greater weight of the evidence, is fair
compensation for the actual physical pain and mental suffering which were the
immediate and necessary consequences of the injury. There is no fixed formula for
evaluating pain and suffering. You will determine what is fair compensation by
applying logic and common sense to the evidence.
Id.at 295.
203. Research demonstrates that "straightforward revisions to complicated legal instructions
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Further even if the instructions were clear, jurors "do not always-and probably cannot
°
always-faithfully follow instructions. They are imperfect decision makers. 204
But
20
5
various jury reforms can help jurors do a better job. And even if there are some
reports of extravagant jury awards, the average award is not out of line, and there is
research showing that juries tend to reward more severe injuries with greater
damages.20 6
Further, it is important to remember that juries do not work alone in the judicial
process and that trial judges and postverdict settlements can play a significant role in
shaping awards.
As Professors Vidmar and Hans concluded:
As we evaluate the case for the jury, we observe many signs that the American jury
is a sound decision maker in the majority of... civil ... trials. Very significant to

us are the research findings that identify the strength of the evidence presented at
the trial as the major determinant of jury verdicts. Civil jury awards are strongly
correlated with the negligence and degree of injury. These reasonable patterns in
jury decisions go a long way to reassuring us that juries, by and large, listen to the
judge and decide cases on the merits of the evidence rather than on biases and
prejudice.
Furthermore, in systematic studies spanning five decades, we find that judges
agree with jury verdicts in most cases.... Most judges say that jurors make a
serious attempt to apply the law, and they do not see jurors relying on their
feelings rather than the law in deciding on a verdict.
The jury's distinctive approach of commonsense justice best explains the
divergence between judge and jury. These juror values affect the verdicts primarily
in trials in which the evidence is relatively evenly balanced and a verdict for either
side could be justified. Other studies, showing that the judgments of medical
experts and20 7arbitrators converge with jury decisions, reinforce this basic
conclusion.

Moreover, it is unclear that judges or administratively mandated caps on
noneconomic damages (such as those suggested by the legal hedonists) would better
approximate ideal damage awards. First, to the extent that hedonic adaptation occurs,
there is not significant information about rates of hedonic adaptation.208 This lack of
produce better understanding and better application of the law." Id. at 342; PETER M. TmRSMA,
COMMUNICATION WITH JURIES: HOW TO DRAFr MORE UNDERSTANDABLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

(2006), availableat http://www.ncsconline.org/Juries/communicating.pdf.
204. ViDMAR & HANS, supra note 198, at 163.

205. For example, reforms that are designed to make jury trials better approximate ideal
educational practices, such as permitting jurors more active roles during trials, can produce
benefits without introducing any feared countervailing harmful side effects. Id. at 343-44, 396.
206. See ViDmAR & HANS, supra note 198, at 299-302. See generally GREENE& BORNSTEIN,
supra note 11.

207. VIDMAR &HANS, supra note 198, at 339-40.
208. There is recent evidence that hedonic adaptation is a nonlinear dynamic process because
the speeds at which formerly fully employed people hedonically adapted to unemployment
decreased with the length of unemployment with the majority ofhedonic adaptation taking place
in the first year of unemployment. See Yannis Georgellis, Andros Gregoriou, Jerome Healy &
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data means that there is a significant gap in the data that is necessary to properly price
damages. More importantly, no study could provide data about individual hedonic
adaptation. That is, even if there is adaptation for a given injury in the population as a
adapts may differ and may
whole, how much and at what rate any particular individual
2 °9
depend on demographic and individual characteristics.
Second, even if we depended on judges to individuate, there is no evidence that
judges would do a betterjob. Recent studies suggest that federal magistrate judges are
unable to follow instructions, make decisions almost identical to juries, and are
affected by cognitive biases and heuristics just like the general public. 210 In fact,
"regular exposure to particular types of cases, defenses, and even specific litigants may
create expectations in judges that are hard to overcome. Because ajury is composed of
persons without1repetitive exposure[,] the jury system gives every litigant the benefit of
a fresh look.',

21

Third, legislative or administrative caps on noneconomic damages (as proposed by
Sunstein 212 and Ubel and Loewenstein 213) may exacerbate inequitable awards. For
example, medical malpractice cases-a particularly controversial set of tort lawsuitsraise several additional issues about noneconomic damages. The main and often-heard
complaint about jury awards in medical malpractice lawsuits is that juries are far too
generous in making pain and suffering awards.214 Such complaints have led some tort
reformers to propose caps on pain and suffering awards based upon arguments that
such awards provide underserved windfalls for plaintiffs and their attorneys, who earn
a percentage of those awards. In 1975, California enacted a $250,000 cap on pain and
215
This example provided a model that twentysuffering and other general damages.
2 16
followed.
three states have since
But, are pain and suffering awards really the windfalls that they are purported to be?
A study of birth and emergency room injuries found that final award amounts averaged
only twenty-two percent more in compensation than actual economic losses. 217 Twentytwo percent is not really such a windfall for a severely injured tort victim. In addition,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned its $350,000 cap on pain and suffering in
medical malpractice cases because it concluded that caps produce inequitable
Nikolaos Tsitsianis, Unemployment andLife Satisfaction:A Non-LinearAdaptationProcess,29
INT'L J. MANPOWER 668, 676-77 (2008); see also Yannis Georgellis, Andros Gregoriou &
Nikolaos Tsitsianis, Adaptation Towards Reference Values: A Non-LinearPerspective,67 J.
EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 768, 769 (2008) (finding non-linearity of adjustment dynamics towards

reference points in job satisfaction).
209. See Lucas, supra note 62, at 728.
210. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging by Heuristic:
CognitiveIllusions in JudicialDecision Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44,50 (2002); Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J.Wistrich, Inside the JudicialMind,86 CORNELL L. REv. 777,
821 (2001).
211. VIDMAR & HANs, supra note 198, at 342.
212. Sunstein, supra note 5, at S 184-86.

213. Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 5, at S210-11.
214. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005).
215. CAL. CrV. CODE § 3333.2 (2009).
216. See Ronen Avrahamn, Databaseof State Tort Law Reforms (Northwestern Law & Econ.

Research Paper No. 06-08, 2006), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid--902711.
217. Frank A. Sloan, Penny B. Githens, Gerald B. Hickson & Stephen S. van Wert,
Compensation, in SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 187, 195 (1993).
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consequences especially to severely injured plaintiffs.218 A systematic analysis ofjury
verdicts in California, Florida, and Maryland found that caps disparately impacted
monetary recoveries by children, elderly people, and women.2 19 That study pointed out
how cap laws "place an effective ceiling on recovery for certain types of injuries
disproportionately experienced by women, including sexual assault and gynecological
injur[ies] that impair childbearing or sexual functioning., 220 A similar argument has
been made that, although statutory caps on noneconomic damages are facially neutral,
they have an unintended consequence of disproportionately disadvantaging women. 221
An empirical study of California's $250,000 cap for noneconomic damages concluded
that: "Plaintiffs with the most severe injuries appear to be at the highest risk for
inadequate compensation.
Hence the worst-off may suffer a kind of 'double jeopardy'
222
caps."
under
Under our previous analysis of the limits to hedonic adaptation, people do not
completely adapt hedonically to recurring pain or severe disfigurement, both of which
are situations that often lead to depression or unemployment-two further events to
which people only incompletely hedonically adapt. Thus, the heterogeneity and
incompleteness of hedonic adaptation provide two additional reasons to be concerned
that caps on pain and suffering damages are going to exacerbate inequities that already
exist in our society and legal system.
CONCLUSION

We believe that recent happiness research is of tremendous importance not only

intrinsically,2 23 but also practically in applications to law and policy.224 Happiness
research, especially of the positive psychology variety, can yield guidance to
individuals and institutions about creating and sustaining happiness, making better
choices, and leading more productive and engaged lives.225 But we currently have
serious concerns about making significant public policy changes based upon an
incomplete, nascent body of empirical research. We also believe that law and policy
are better when based upon research from nonlaw fields including anthropology,
economics, neuroscience, political science, psychology, and sociology. But in the

218. Ferdon v. Wis. Patients' Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440,485 (Wis. 2005).
219. Lucinda Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children,andthe Elderly,
53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1284-1312 (2004).

220. Id.at 1313.
221. See generally Rebecca Korzec, Maryland Tort Damages: A Form of Sex-Based
Discrimination,37 U. BALT. L.F. 97, 97-98 (2007).
222. David M. Studdert, Y. Tony Yang & Michelle M. Mello, Are Damage Caps
Regressive? A Study of MalpracticeJury Verdicts in California,HEALTH AFF., July/August
2004, at 54, 63.
223. See generally SONJA LYuBoMIRSKY, THE How OF HAPPINESs: A ScIENTIFIC APPROACH
To GETTING THE LIFE YOU WANT 13-26 (2007).

224. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Consumption, Happiness,and
Climate Change, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10834, 10834-35 (2008); Paul Dolan & Mathew P. White,
How Can Measures of Subjective Well-Being Be Used to Inform Public Policy?, 2 PERSP.
PSYCHOL. Sci. 71, 72-73 (2007).
225. See, e.g., Blumenthal & Huang, supranote 22; Huang & Swedloff, supranote 33,339-
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history of science,226 there has been a pattern of new ideas and novel insights being too
quickly and inaptly applied, only to create a backlash followed by more careful and
nuanced applications. Scholars can and should be more creative and precise in
developing the subtle legal policy implications of happiness research that pays close
attention to economic and psychological realities. Both of us have already expressed a
number of concerns and reservations towards basing legal policy about settlement
decisions in civil lawsuits upon earlier findings regarding hedonic adaptation. 227 Our
concerns here are similar. We simply do not believe that current data on hedonic
adaptation support eliminating a basic building block of our civil justice system. It is
not yet clear that hedonic adaptation actually plays, or even should play, a role in
monetizing noneconomic damages. There are significant data about hedonic
adaptation, but all of it points in different theoretical directions. Just as theories without
data can be speculations, data without any theory can be uninformative. Lacking such a
unified theoretical foundation, the mass of data that is being produced has multiple
interpretations and thus is not as useful as it could be to legal policy makers. Thus, we
believe that legal policy based on hedonic adaptation is not yet ready for prime time.
We believe that juries can and should play a vital role in assessing and individuating
damage awards. This role is extremely important in the noneconomic context, where
juries cannot just look to medical bills or income projections to mechanically craft a
damage award. Here, where the data supporting the argument against jury awards are
not that strong, we disagree with dismantling such a vital civil system as the jury
system. That being said, juries could benefit from additional guidance. This guidance
228
might come in the form of expert testimony about happiness,
additional lay
testimony about individual adaptation or loss of real options as a result of injury, or
improved jury instructions. More research, however, is necessary to fully evaluate the
best means to deliver these messages to juries. For example, new technologies for
neuroimaging have the potential to revolutionize the detection, verification, and legal
determination of an individual's pain and its extent. 229 There is also research that

226. See generallyTHOMAS S. KUHN, TIHE STRUCTURE

OF ScIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS (1996).
227. Peter H. Huang, EmotionalAdaptation and Lawsuit Settlements 108 COLUM. L. REv.
SIDEBAR 50, 52-55 (2008), http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/108/
50_Huang.pdf; Rick Swedloff, Accountingfor Happinessin Civil Settlements, 108 COLUM. L.
REv. SIDEBAR 39, 40-46 (2008), http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/l08/
39_Swedloff.pdf
228. For example, two economists recently utilized happiness regression equations to
determine compensatory damages for emotional harm and pain and suffering in tort cases
involving death of a loved one. Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 87. One of these economists
has estimated monetary values for how much increased life satisfaction individuals experience
due to more frequent interaction with their friends, relatives, and neighbors based upon the
British Household Panel Survey. Nattavudh Powdthavee, Putting A Price Tag on Friends,
Relatives, andNeighbours: Using Surveys ofLife Satisfactionto Value Social Relationships,37
J. Socio-EcoN. 1459, 1474-75 (2008).
229. Ron Kupers &Henrik Kehlet, BrainImaging of ClinicalPainStates: A CriticalReview
and Strategiesfor Future Studies, 5 LANCET NEUROLOGY 1033, 1038-39 (2006); Noel Shafti,
Neuroscienceand Law: The Evidentiary Value ofBrain Imaging, 11 GRADUATE STUDENT J.
PSYCHOL. 27, 37 (2009), available at http://www.tc.columbia.edu/i/a/document/l 1330_
VI 1Article4.pdf; David Yokum, Neuroimaging the Brain in Pain: Medical Disability, Tort
Law, and an EthicalEvaluation, 9 J. PAiN SuPp., Apr. 2008, at 79 (abstract describing poster
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suggests genetic differences may underlie why people differ in their adaptation to,
experience of, and memories about pain.23 °

presentation); Betsy Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the
American Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, (Nov. 4,2009), (unpublished
manuscript available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1499989).
230. See, e.g., Jon-Kar Zubieta, Mary M. Heitzeg, Yolanda R. Smith, Joshua A. Bueller, Ke
Xu, Yanjun Xu, Robert A. Koeppe, Christian S. Stohler & David Goldman, COMTval158met
GenotypeAffects p-OpioidNeurotransmitterResponses to a PainStressor,299 ScI. 1240, 1240
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